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ABSTRACT 
EXCELLENCE V. EFFECTIVENESS: 
AN EXPLORATION OF MACINTYRE’S CRITIQUE OF BUSINESS 
SEPTEMBER 1993 
CHARLES M. HORVATH, B.S., PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY 
M.B.A., PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY 
M.Div., GORDON-CONWELL THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor D. Anthony Butterfield 
Alasdair MacIntyre [1984] asserts that the ethical systems of the Enlightenment (formalism 
and utilitarianism) have failed to provide a meaningful definition of "good." Lacking such a 
definition, business managers have no internal standards by which they can morally evaluate 
their roles or acts. MacIntyre goes on to claim that managers have substituted external 
measures of "winning" or "effectiveness" for any internal concept of good. He supports a 
return to the Aristotelian notion of virtue or "excellence." Such a system of virtue-based ethics 
depends on an interrelationship of the community, one’s roles in that community, and the 
virtues one needs to perform that role well. 
This study presents MacIntyre’s position, stressing its implications for business ethics. It 
presents an empirical study to determine if MacIntyre’s assertions about the existence of an 
excellence/effectiveness dichotomy can be supported. 
I use a scenario to present an ethically ambiguous situation which reflects MacIntyre’s 
dichotomy. A sample of 25 practicing managers taking MBA courses at different New 
England schools participated in this study. After these respondents read the scenario and 
decided upon courses of action, they then performed a Q sort to prioritize their reasons for 
deciding as they did. 
v 
The hypothesis that an excellence/effectiveness dichotomy exists for managerial priorities 
was supported. Factor analysis revealed four factors which accounted for 68.3% of the total 
variance. Eighteen of the 25 respondents clustered on a factor which strongly reflected an 
ethic of emphasis on excellence while the other 7 clustered on three factors which expressed 
various versions of MacIntyre’s concept of an ethic of effectiveness. I interpret these four 
factors to see what they reveal about the subjective priorities of the respondents. 
Beyond this core hypothesis, the following research question was asked: What 
demographic and attitudinal variables might be associated with the respondents who report an 
excellent or effective orientation? Using Chi-square tests, I found that "effective" managers 
were more likely than "excellent" managers to be in a marketing class, to choose an aggressive 
marketing response to the scenario’s situation, and to be younger. 
This study concludes with some recommendations for theoretical development and some 
avenues for future research. 
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GLOSSARY 
agathos: (originally) to be good at doing what one’s role requires; (later) good 
agon: the contest 
arete: excellence (in doing something well); virtue 
eudaimonia: blessedness, happiness, prosperity; being well and doing well 
hesuchia: peacefulness of spirit after a job well done 
phronesis: practical wisdom; claiming what is rightfully yours 
pleonexia: acquisitiveness (a vice) 
polis: city (basic social unit of community in time of Aristotle) 
sophrosune: the non-abuse of power 
telos: an end or goal, which includes a connotation of completion or fulfillment 
xm 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The field of business ethics is in a state of transition. Dissatisfaction exists with the 
apparent ineffectiveness of business ethics curricula, with the lack of theoretical clarity and 
consistency in the ethical theories used, and with the lack of relevance to other areas of 
business studies (notably organizational behavior). I begin this dissertation with a 
consideration of each of these three concerns. 
The first concern involves the apparent failure of business ethics. In the following section, 
I cite several articles in business journals which lament the self-serving behavior of managers 
and their lack of concern for the broader impact of their actions. Present approaches to 
teaching business ethics and to helping managers incorporate ethical perspectives in their daily 
activities appear inadequate. 
The second concern involves the lack of theoretical clarity in business ethics. The ethical 
systems presented to students have insufficient specificity to provide clear guides to action and 
they lack any motivational power to elicit compliance when a preferred action can be 
identified. In a related vein, research in this field suffers from a lack of theoretical and 
empirical rigor. 
The third concern involves the growing dissatisfaction with the perceived irrelevancy of 
business ethics as it concentrates on external issues such as pollution and plant closings. 
While such issues may be relevant to corporate CEO’s, internal issues such as superior/ 
subordinate relations, organizational culture, and the ethical dimensions of power/authority 
have more relevance to most students and managers. Further, abstract ethical theories do not 
address the underlying issue of motivation. Each of these "internal" issues already receives 
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consideration in the domain of organizational behavior. Can business ethics address these 
common issues directly? 
In this first chapter I develop these concerns. Then, in Chapters 2 and 3, I present the 
work of Alasdair MacIntyre as a possible solution. He argues for a virtue-based ethics (VBE) 
using an Aristotelian framework. This VBE offers answers to each of the three concerns in 
the business ethics field. 
In Chapter 2 I present MacIntyre’s explanation of why ethics (as presently understood) 
cannot present a clear, usable theory and therefore fails to help managers. This includes 
discussions of MacIntyre’s treatment of formalism, utilitarianism, ethical relativism, and 
business ethics in particular. In Chapter 3 I present his theory of virtue-based ethics, paying 
special attention to its use as a paradigm for business ethics. MacIntyre makes specific claims 
about the ways in which modem business pushes individuals into self-serving behaviors based 
on the ethic of "winning." Do managers actually use such an ethic? If so, do they see this 
ethic as rooted in the nature of their business roles? I move beyond MacIntyre to present a 
literature review of related works dealing specifically with business ethics, including 
discussions of the problems associated with research in this field. This chapter concludes the 
theory section with a hypothesis and a research question. 
In Chapter 4 I explain the evolution of the methodology used in this study. I use a 
scenario combined with Q methodology to look for answers. Chapter 5 contains the results of 
this study which support MacIntyre’s basic claim for an excellence/effectiveness dichotomy. I 
also use x2 tests to highlight significant relationships between these managerial preferences and 
variables including age and sex. Chapter 6 includes a discussion of the study results and 
suggestions for further research. 
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1.1. The Failure of Business Ethics 
In his book, Moral Mazes [1988], Jackall describes a business world filled with people 
who put their own success over any sense of duty to their companies or society. Their 
behavior hurts their companies and their communities. But they don’t care about these 
consequences, let alone the immorality of their behaviors. Personal achievement- defined in 
terms of money, power, and promotion- provides their standard of success. Jackall’s portrait 
of business "ethics" is truly disturbing. 
He is not alone in his concern about the state of business ethics. Although these negative 
descriptions do not fit all managers, they do apply to a significant number. Some business 
ethicists describe managers as self-centered and manipulative [Posner & Schmidt, 1984; 
Ralston, 1985] while others find them lacking integrity [Kerr, 1988]. Mitchell & Scott also 
express concern: 
We believe the most serious threat to our society is American leaders [sic] 
lack of stewardship of which the S&L debacle is a recent egregious example. 
Management abuses of trust are everywhere and some say the lack of moral 
leadership is America’s number one problem.... 
[D]ata suggest that American values now reflect a present, instrumental, 
individualistic orientation and that... these values are reflected in behavior that 
maximizes personal advantage in the short run and discounts the long run costs of 
disregarding ethics, the underclass, and the environment. [1990: 24-25, 26] 
Davis’ [1991] treatment of managers’ use of "poison pills," often to the detriment of the very 
organizations they manage, adds further support to such contentions. 
Parallelling these specific concerns for ethical organizations is a more general concern 
about the dominance of individualism over any sense of community. On the national level, 
Patterson [1991] and Glendon [1991] note how a national focus on individual rights may be 
destroying the society which enables individuals to claim those rights in the first place. 
Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton [1985] look at this tension from more of a 
cultural perspective. Finally, Heilbroner [1989] discusses an ethical crisis for capitalism. He 
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wonders if the next generation of business persons will be able to stem the destructive 
emphasis on individualism inherent in the system. 
In another vein, Bird & Waters [1989] discuss the "moral muteness" of managers. They 
begin their work by stating that "many managers exhibit a reluctance to describe their actions 
in moral terms even when they are acting for moral reasons" [1989: 73]. They show how this 
reluctance reflects a belief that ethics does not fit within business thinking. As a result, 
managers drift away from ethical considerations and towards a self-serving pragmatism similar 
to that described by Jackall. Indeed, "ethical discourse" appears to rationalize unethical 
behavior. Gellerman [1986] presented this insight over a decade ago, and Giacalone & 
Knouse [1990] have reinforced this conclusion just recently. Harrington [1991] notes these 
same issues even as she addresses business efforts to create "ethical corporate cultures." 
Textbooks on business ethics include numerous examples of business wrong-doing and 
many lament the apparent amorality of business persons. DeGeorge [1990: 3-4] begins with 
the claim that many people perceive business people as "amoral," focusing only on profit 
maximization. Cavanagh [1990: 25] warns that "an exclusive focus on self-interest can breed 
an arrogance in pursuing narrow goals, a self-righteousness resulting in indifference to 
consequences." George [1988] calls for a recognition that courses in business ethics are not 
fulfilling their mission to develop ethically responsible managers. 
This first Section presents the problem in concrete terms. Managers either ignore ethics 
altogether or find they cannot "apply" ethics to their real-world problems. This irrelevancy of 
business ethics suggests some theoretical deficiencies. Section 1.2 addresses this possibility. 
1.2. Theoretical Problems in Business Ethics 
The philosophical roots of business ethics are the principle-based ethics (PBE) of 
Immanuel Kant’s formalism [1956, 1959] and John Stuart Mill’s utilitarianism [1957]. These 
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systems provide guidelines to help people evaluate which acts are morally right and which acts 
are morally wrong. Although these two systems differ in a number of areas, they both start 
with a group-centered perspective as opposed to a self-centered one. Good people consider 
how their acts affect everyone, not just themselves. 
Both Kant and Mill claim that the reasonableness inherent in their respective systems 
should be self-evident to rational people. Further, Kant and Mill believe rational people 
should choose to follow these ethical guidelines in all aspects of their lives. In effect, both 
theorists link rationality with goodness. 
Many business ethicists appear to follow the same line of reasoning. A survey of business 
ethics textbooks [e.g. Brady, 1990; Cavanagh, 1990; DeGeorge, 1990; Hosmer, 1991; Shaw & 
Barry, 1992; Velasquez, 1992] reveals that most of these present utilitarianism and/or Kantian 
formalism as the bases for business ethics. 
But dissatisfaction with PBE has grown in the past several years. An exclusive reliance on 
PBE has created four recurring problems for business ethicists. First, PBE does not adequately 
address the issue of ethical motivation: 
Principle-based ethics... emphasizes doing rather than being. Its exclusive focus on 
action tends to assume that all acts can be determined, through rational scrutiny, to 
be obligatory, prohibited, or permissible.... Additionally, that approach provides no 
real answer to the question of motivation: Why, finally, should the moral agent 
follow a particular principle? [Furman, 1990: 33] 
Stevenson [1989] cites Hume in his criticism of an over reliance on human reason within all 
areas of organizational studies. On a macro level, Etzioni [1988] goes further, stating that not 
only is the dependence on reason flawed (as in the flawed assumption of a rational actor in 
economics) but often irrational elements (such as moral behavior) provide the roots of more 
productive behavior. 
Presenting ethical content is only the first step in making business ethics relevant to 
managers. One must also address ethical motivation: 'Why should I be good or do right?' 
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This "why" question provides a bridge between business ethics and the mainstream of 
organizational studies: 
When one links knowledge of moral reasoning, value preferences, ethical 
principles relied upon most frequently- in other words, all of the pre-behavioral 
understanding now possible to achieve through empirical research- with 
knowledge of an organizations’s ethical climate, the dominant features of the 
firm’s culture, and the prevailing ethical traditions and practices of its industry, 
then a more reliable (if more complex) picture emerges of how cognition and 
behavior intersect amd merge in everyday business life. [Frederick, 1992b: 93-94] 
Frederick notes that more attention must be addressed to motivational issues which encourage 
and/or discourage ethical behavior. 
A second reason for the failure of PBE involves its generality. Neither formalism nor 
utilitarianism provides the basis for predictable decisions to specific situations. Derry & 
Green [1989] and Rachels [1993] note this lack of specificity when these systems are applied 
to business ethics’ cases. Di Norcia [1988] and Brady [1986] point out how PBE does not 
support business persons with concrete solutions to ethical quandaries. 
The third problem with PBE stems from the mutual incompatibility of formalism and 
utilitarianism. Both formalism and utilitarianism are presented as the foundation for morals 
and both are presented as proving their cases with irrefutable logic. Yet both deny the claims 
of the other. How can both be right when claiming the other is not? 
The fourth problem involves not so much a theoretical weaknesses as a practical 
deficiency. Business ethics tends to be predominantly utilitarian [Barach & Elstrott, 1988]. 
But the modem form of this ethical theory is less than Bentham or Mill would accept. Rather 
than an enlightened self-interest which disinterestedly accounts for the concerns of all, it has 
become a Machiavellian calculation of ends apart from means [cf. Giacalone & Knouse, 1990; 
Jay, 1967]. As Cavanagh, Moberg, & Velasquez explain: 
This calculative emphasis defines theoretical debate over ethics in terms of the 
desirability of outcomes and tends to ignore the value of the activities, processes, 
and behaviors involved, independent of the outcomes achieved.... Such an 
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emphasis inevitably leads to a kind of ends-justify-the-means logic that fails to 
provide guidance for managers beyond linking alternatives to outcomes. [1981: 
366] 
These authors highlight an issue which I develop further under the rubric of "effectiveness." 
This term refers to accomplishment of a task. In itself, the term effectiveness carries positive 
connotations. People need to accomplish tasks in all areas of life. Learning to "get the job 
done" is an important part of growing up. But when a concern with effectiveness becomes an 
ethic unto itself, problems arise. I address these problems in Chapter 2. 
The theoretical weaknesses of utilitarianism and formalism, particularly as these are 
presented within a business ethics framework, foster the ethical problems described in Section 
1.1. But these theoretical weaknesses have another aspect. 
1.3. Business Ethics as a Business Discipline 
William Kahn [1990] has called for the development of an agenda for the field of business 
ethics research. Such an agenda must recognize the interdisciplinary nature of business ethics: 
The ideal framework would array concepts from the various disciplines-- 
philosophy, theology, management, and the social sciences-- in a way that gives 
shape and coherence... 
... The field lies at the intersection of two types of sensibilities; those focusing 
on abstractions and theoretical frameworks and those focusing on relatively 
concrete tools used to bring about change [1990: 311] 
Studies in organizational behavior focus on why people act as they do within organizational 
settings. Business ethics prescribe such behavior. Exploring the interface between these two 
disciplines could enrich both. Fleming [1987] lends support to such an integration, noting that 
a "value-free" approach to organizational behavior limits the relevance of this discipline. 
Further support for integrating a humanities-based perspective into the organizational studies 
includes Astley [1985], Brady [1986], Harrington [1991], Keeley [1983], and Kukla [1989]. 
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Kahn sets forth four images which might guide business ethics research: conversation, 
history, vision, and community. These images can blend together 
Taken together, the four images suggest that an ideal ethical system is one in 
which members strive to make a set of connections: with one another, in dialogue; 
with the historical antecedents of present patterns of thought and action; with the 
ideals they clarify and imagine; and with a larger community of diverse members 
straining toward shared goals [1990: 318]. 
He develops each of these four images by suggesting research questions which they might 
generate and issues they might clarify. Such an agenda would serve a number of purposes: 
One purpose is to develop powerful theoretical frames and concepts. Another 
puipose is to help create conditions for ethical behavior both in organizations and 
from organizations. A third puipose is to create a group of researchers whose 
work together allows for the development of theory and practice in such a frankly 
interdisciplinary area [1990: 319]. 
Unfortunately, such integration has been slow in coming. The principle-based ethics of 
Kant and Mill deal with abstract reason and generic principles. These ethical systems do not 
mesh naturally with the topics relevant to organizational behavior. 
So far I have addressed some of the major problems in business ethics. Virtue-based 
ethics (VBE) is an alternative approach which is gaining prominence. At this point, the 
alternative is not clearly defined, but a common focus on individual and organizational 
character can be discerned. Within the popular literature, this shift exists in works such as 
Peters & Waterman’s The Search for Excellence [19821, Blanchard & Peale’s The Power of 
Ethical Management [1988], Sen’s On Ethics & Economics [1987], Etzioni’s The Moral 
Dimension [1988], and Covey’s Principle-Centered Leadership [1992]. 
Within academic circles, this idea of character has been implicit in the on-going research 
into managerial values. This began with England [1967] and Rokeach [1973], and continued 
with studies such as those of England, Dhingra, & Agarwal [1974], Lusk & Oliver [1974], 
Posner & Schmidt [1984, 1987, 1992], Fritzsche [1987a,b], and Kuhn, [1992]. Throughout 
this research, the values of honesty, integrity, and competence emerge time and again. 
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Although these studies center on the values held by the managers, and not the "character" of 
the managers themselves, strongly held values do shape or reflect the character of those 
holding them. Indeed, the most common definition of "virtue" is "a trait of character that is 
manifested in habitual actions" [Rachels, 1993: 162]. 
Another theme already present in business ethics research involves the tension felt by 
managers as they are challenged by corporate pressures to compromise these ethical values. 
Hegarty & Sims [1978, 1979] highlight the ways in which competitive pressures work against 
ethical decision-making. Another anathema to ethical behavior is the rise of politicized 
organizations in which parochial interests receive priority over any more global (and ethical) 
perspectives. These works highlight ways in which intra-organization politics become com¬ 
petitive and adversarial [Allison, 1971; Heller, 1985; Machan & Uyl, 1987; Wangerin, 1990]. 
These works are more closely related to the humanities than the social sciences. But even 
within organizational studies, there is a rising recognition that such discourses should be a part 
of our focus, even if this requires a paradigm shift away from a purely positivist perspective. 
Mulligan [1987] considers the role of business ethics within the larger realm of business 
education. He notes that while the academic discipline of "ethics" falls within the humanities, 
other business disciplines have been considered social sciences. He sees the need to 
reintroduce the humanities into business education and the need to have such humanities 
(particularly ethics) perceived as legitimate among business school academics. While he notes 
significant difficulties in such an amalgamation (referring to these disparate disciplines as 
different cultures), he anticipates a significant benefit from the effort: 
It seems that the two cultures could complement one another in business 
education. On the one hand, management science is greatly occupied with 
discovering and describing the means by which business’ ends are or could be 
achieved— the technical features, for example, of efficient markets, optimal 
production processes, suboptimal organizations, or satisficing decisions making. 
On the other hand, the humanities (business ethics in particular) are suited to 
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consider what the ends of business ultimately ought to be, in terms of human 
fulfillment and moral merit [1987: 595]. 
Bellah also calls for a return to an older concept of the social sciences which kept open the 
boundary between science and philosophy. He suggests a "synoptic view" which is at once 
philosophical, historical and sociological [1985: 36]. As a third voice, Harrington comments: 
"A strong corporate culture and ethics are strategic for survival and profitability in a highly 
competitive era." She advocates that organizations "aid decision-making by... legitimizing the 
consideration of ethics as part of decision-making" [1991: 21,23]. All of these authors share 
Kahn’s [1990b] call for an integrated discipline. 
Links already exist in academic literature concerning organizational influence on character 
development. Etzioni [1961; see also Chatman & O’Reilly, 1986] explores the links between 
organizational power and members’ involvement, setting forth a typology linking the following 
power/involvement pairs: coercive/alienative, remunerative/calculative, and normative/moral. 
Another link between organizations and character can be found in Schein’s work on organi¬ 
zational culture [1968, 1985, 1990; also O’Reilly, 1989, O’Reilly, Chatman, & Caldwell, 1991, 
Pascale, 1985, Rousseau, 1990]. Much of this work deals directly with organizational values 
and their transmission to organizational members through enculturation or socialization. 
Schein’s concept of "basic assumptions" [1985: 14] includes such fundamentals as the very 
"nature of human nature" and the "nature of human relationships." Organizational cultures can 
shape people’s values (and possibly their character as well) into a form which that particular 
culture defines as "good." 
A third set of connections between organizational behavior and ethics exists within the 
area of leadership. Bass [1991: 905-906] calls for the study of the ethics of leadership. In 
particular, he notes Bums’ [1978] work contrasting transactional and transformational 
leadership. Kuhnert & Lewis [1987] provide an example of such research by exploring Bums’ 
types of leaders using Kegan’s stages of cognitive development. Howell & Avolio [1992] 
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have pursued this path in exploring the ethical character of charismatic leaders [so, too, 
Thomas & Velthouse, 1990]. They found that good charismatics valued both society and 
subordinates while bad charismatics valued self and personal success. 
In summary, business ethics needs an alternative to PBE. This alternative should be an 
approach to ethics which is particularly compatible with the specific needs of business ethics. 
It should offer a paradigm which answers Kahn’s called for an integrated approach to ethical 
issues facing managers. 
1.4. A Paradigm Shift for Business Ethics? 
Having reviewed these concerns and movements in the field of business ethics, I now turn 
to an ethical paradigm suggested by Alasdair MacIntyre. MacIntyre criticizes the various 
forms of PBE as theoretically inadequate. He also provides a rationale to explain why a 
business ethic based on formalism or utilitarianism will fail to alter behavior. In so doing, he 
offers a theoretical rationale which legitimates the concerns (both practical and theoretical) set 
forth in Sections 1.1 and 1.2. 
Virtue-based ethics (VBE) is MacIntyre’s alternative. This is a paradigm which focuses on 
community, roles, and virtues. It addresses the dynamics of how organizational culture and 
personal character intertwine. In so doing, this paradigm offers a theoretical basis for inte¬ 
grating business ethics into organizational studies and also offers a systematic framework for 
the popular concern with a morality of being and not just a morality of doing. Thus VBE 
meets the concerns set forth in the preceding sections. 
MacIntyre suggests that neither formalism nor utilitarianism can provide the individual 
motivation necessary to accomplish right actions. He proclaims the need to return to the 
Aristotelian concept of the "good person," the virtuous person. This traditional ethical 
paradigm begins with the community as the ethical base rather than individual reason. Within 
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a community, people occupy recognized roles, and these roles in turn include ethical 
obligations. To fill such roles well, people need to develop virtues within themselves. The 
Greek term for virtue is aret6. This term also means "excellence." A virtue is the ability to 
do something in an excellent manner. These are the three main components of VBE: 
community, roles, and virtues. 
Virtue, or excellence, stands in contrast to the external standard of "effectiveness." 
MacIntyre develops a fundamental dichotomy between managers who define "good" in terms 
of the internal standard, "virtue," and those who define "good" in terms of an external 
standard, "winning." He also claims that the modem understanding of business "legitimacy" 
pushes people into the former category. 
His approach has attracted a number of supporters within the business disciplines: These 
include Bellah & King [1989], DesJardins [1984], Klein, [1988a,b, 1989], May [1984], 
McDowell [1990], Miceli & Castelfranchi [1989], Sampson [1989], Schwartz [1990], Vitz 
[1990], Williams [1990], Williams & Murphy [1990]. A common thread running through 
these works involves the need for business persons to develop moral character, to become 
good people. While Solomon [1992, 1993] does not agree with MacIntyre’s emphasis on the 
historical development of the Aristotelian tradition, he does concur with the centrality of an 
Aristotelian paradigm for business ethics. 
Most of the works just cited are either theoretical or normative. To answer Kahn’s call for 
an approach combining ethics and organizational behavior, MacIntyre’s VBE needs to be 
related to organizational contexts. Solomon [1993] has already taken a step in this direction, 
but more needs to be done. The VBE model needs to be expanded and linked to other areas 
of study in the field of organizational behavior. Further, it needs to be validated empirically. 
After all, the integration of the humanities and social sciences does not mean the loss of either, 
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but rather the enrichment of both. To the extent that empirical substantiation is possible, 
objective support can buttress the logical coherence of the model. 
This study attempts to present MacIntyre’s case for VBE and empirically test his claim for 
an excellence/effectiveness dichotomy. In the next two chapters, I present MacIntyre’s 
position in more detail by documenting both explicit and implicit links to organizational 
studies. Chapter 2 presents MacIntyre’s critique of the PBE systems of formalism and 
utilitarianism. It offers a rationale which legitimates the concerns about the present state of 
business ethics. Chapter 3 presents MacIntyre’s VBE alternative and develops links between 
this ethical paradigm and areas of interest to organizational studies. In so doing, an initial 
attempt is made to meet Kahn’s [1990] call for a revised approach to business ethics. 
The excellence/effectiveness dichotomy is basic to MacIntyre’s system. If managers do 
manifest such distinct definitions of what is "good", they should be empirically verifiable. 
Chapter 3 concludes with a hypothesis and research question. Chapter 4 contains the specific 
methodology used to study this issue: a Managerial Scenario and a Q sort based on this 
scenario. Chapter 5, in turn, presents the results of the study. Chapter 6 concludes this work 
with a discussion and suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
MACINTYRE ON ETHICS 
Alasdair MacIntyre may be described as an historian of ethics. He has written three key 
works in which he traces the rise of modem ethical approaches: After Virtue [1984], Whose 
Justice? Which Rationality? [1988], and Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclo¬ 
paedia, Genealogy, and Tradition [1990]. He traces the rise of formalism and utilitarianism 
from their roots in the Enlightenment and its emphasis on reason. He then shows how Hume 
shifted Western thought with his emphasis on passions overruling reason. MacIntyre claims 
that this shift led to the rise of ethical relativism, since both formalism1 and utilitarianism 
have internal flaws which vitiate their normative power. I explore MacIntyre’s arguments 
concerning each of these three moral systems in the following sections. 
MacIntyre addresses business ethics in After Virtue. He suggests that business ethics as 
practiced has adopted a utilitarian perspective which has degenerated into a simplistic emphasis 
on "success" as measured in economic terms (cf. "the bottom line"). He finds this emphasis 
particularly antagonistic to the development of moral character in business professionals. 
In his criticisms of modem ethical theories, MacIntyre both predicts the modem dilemmas 
about the failure of ethics training and sets the stage for his alternative. In this chapter, I 
explore his claims against principle-based ethics (PBE). Business ethicists have made many of 
the same claims, and several citations in Chapters 2 will illustrate these parallels. 
1. The term "formalism" technically refers to any ethical system which proposes a forni of 
ethical reasoning which should be followed in order to determine the correct ethical act. As such, 
Kant’s deontological theory is but one formalistic system; Rawls theory of justice [1971] is 
another. As I concentrate on Kant’s system in this study, the term formalism will refer 
exclusively to his work unless I specifically note a different application. 
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2.1. On Ethics in General 
MacIntyre [1984, 1988, 1990; see also Barach & Elstrott, 1988] claims that Western 
civilization has lost its ethical heritage. He asserts that the Enlightenment philosophers 
(specifically Kant and Mill) studied philosophy in general and ethics in particular as an 
exercise in timeless reasoning: 
It was a central aspiration of the Enlightenment... to provide for debate in the pub¬ 
lic realm standards and methods of rational justification [sic].... So, it was hoped, 
reason would displace authority and tradition. Rational justification was to appeal 
to principles undeniable by any rational person and therefore independent of all 
those social and cultural particularities which the Enlightenment thinkers took to 
be the mere accidental clothing of reason in particular times and places [1988: 6]. 
But in so doing, these philosophers separated themselves- and society- from their heritage. 
Barach & Elstrott [1988: 546] discuss the rise of "doctrineless individualism" in England 
during this period. 
MacIntyre [1984: 51-61; 1988: 389-404] argues that no one can write about human nature 
and social relations without relating such work both to a preceding philosophical tradition and 
his/her own social setting. Thus Bentham and Mill wrote about the nature of humanity as 
exhibited in English society while Kant actually described a German conception of rationality. 
Yet these philosophers did not recognize their own cultural dependence. 
MacIntyre’s position on this key link between culture and ethics finds support in 
sociological and business literature. Berger & Luckmann’s work on The Social Construction 
of Reality [1966] and Burrell & Morgan’s Sociological paradigms and organisational analysis: 
Elements of the sociology in corporate life [1979] make similar claims. But MacIntyre does 
not go so far as these writers. Rather, he suggests a middle position. Particularly in Whose 
Justice? Which Rationality?, he recognizes the social embeddedness of ethics yet sees a 
process of developing and refining a tradition so that a theory can more closely approximate an 
ideal truth (or reality). 
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In such a development, he parallels Kuhn [1977] while again taking a middle position. 
Kuhn claims that epistemological crises spark revolutions in science. MacIntyre acknow¬ 
ledges such crises, but suggests that instead of revolutions which break with the past, such 
crises redefine past understandings without completely rejecting prior work [1977; cf. 
MacIntyre, 1988, 1990]. For MacIntyre, tradition is not the all-or-nothing monolith which 
Kuhn implies. Traditions can-- and do- evolve. 
MacIntyre notes one other shift in the development of Enlightenment ethics. Whereas 
traditional ethics before the Enlightenment focused on the character of the person and his/her 
relationship to society [cf. Aristotle, 1962, 1985], Enlightenment ethics shifted the focus to the 
rightness of individual acts apart from the character of the actor. Character thus became a 
secondary consideration. In its modem version, ethics does not address the character of the 
subject at all: ethics looks only at the rightness of the act itself. 
2.2. On Formalism 
Turning now to MacIntyre’s specific criticisms of modem ethical systems, I begin with his 
comments concerning formalism. Its traditional form is that of Kant’s Categorical Imperative, 
which serves as a standard by which various acts can be judged to be right or wrong. It is 
"categorical" because all rational beings should obey it all of the time. Kant expressed this 
Imperative in two forms: 
* Act only according to the maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should 
become universal law. 
* Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as 
an end and never as a means only. [Kant, 1959: 39, 47] 
According to Kant, there are fundamental rights and wrongs which mandate the performance 
of certain acts and prohibit others regardless of the immediate consequences of such actions. 
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Kant’s Categorical Imperative is an attempt to create a rational universal standard by which 
such ethical judgments can be evaluated. 
MacIntyre perceives a fundamental flaw in Kant’s system: 
Central to Kant’s moral philosophy are two deceptively simple theses: if the 
rules of morality are rational, they must be the same for all rational beings, in just 
the way that the rules of arithmetic are; and if the rules of morality are binding on 
all rational beings, then the contingent ability of such beings to carry them out 
must be unimportant- what is important is their will to carry them out.... [1984: 
43-44] [emphasis his] 
MacIntyre asserts that Kant’s assumption of such a rational "will" to do right cannot motivate 
individuals in the face of emotional and/or social pressures to act contrary to such a sense of 
duty. In this, he supports Hume [1978]. Formalism rests upon a flawed vision of how ration¬ 
ality is linked to motivation: 
I may propose a course of action to someone either by offering him reasons for so 
acting or by trying to influence him in non-rational ways. If I do the former I 
treat him as a rational will.... By contrast an attempt at a non-rational suasion 
embodies an attempt to make the agent a mere instrument of my will, without any 
regard for his rationality. Thus what Kant enjoins is that a long line of moral 
philosophers have followed the Plato of the Georgias in enjoining. But Kant gives 
us no good reason for holding this position. I can without any inconsistency 
whatsoever flout it; ’Let everyone except me be treated as a means’ may be 
immoral, but it is not inconsistent and there is not even any inconsistency in 
willing a universe of egotists all of whom live by this maxim. It might be 
inconvenient for each if everyone lived by this maxim, but it would not be 
impossible... [1984: 46] 
Kant’s universal ethic fails if rationality is unable to provide a universal basis for norms 
and/or if rationality fails to motivate individuals to obey such norms. MacIntyre asserts that 
rationality fails in both tasks: people cannot be rational in the way Kant demands [1984: 21]. 
One particular subset of formalism involves the concept of human rights. Claiming such 
rights for oneself carries the demand that others must honor or respect these rights and not 
violate them. MacIntyre explores this concept of "rights" as these have developed in the West. 
He notes that the term right implies some sort of entitlement. 
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... those forms of human behavior which presuppose notions of some ground to 
entitlement, such as the notion of a right, always have a highly specific and 
socially local character, and that the existence of particular types of social insti¬ 
tution or practice is a necessary condition for the notion of a claim to the posses¬ 
sion of a right being an intelligible type of human performance.... Lacking any 
such social form, the making of claim to a right would be like presenting a check 
for payment in a social order that lacked the institution of money [1984: 67]. 
Here MacIntyre claims that "rights" can only have meaning when a social structure exists to 
deliver such rights. A "right to life" requires an enforcement structure which will punish those 
who take the lives of others. If such a right to life further implies an entitlement to support 
(e.g. "My right to life entitles me to food...") then the social structure must be able to provide 
that support (e.g. welfare). Without community commitment to honor specific rights, claiming 
them is meaningless. One can claim an entitlement to food and still starve. 
In an individualistic society, self-centered demands necessarily go unmet when no one 
accepts responsibility for meeting those demands. Social rights exist only when socially 
enforced. Yet the notion of rights developed during the Enlightenment was not based on a 
social commitment to honor them. Rather, rights were proclaimed as universalized forms: 
By ’rights’ I do not mean those rights conferred by positive law or custom on 
specified classes of person; I mean those rights which are alleged to belong to 
human beings as such and which are cited as a reason for holding that people 
ought not to be interfered with in their pursuit of life, liberty and happiness. They 
are the rights which are spoken of in the eighteenth century as natural rights or as 
the rights of man [1984: 68-69]. 
MacIntyre claims that "every attempt to give good reasons for believing that there are such 
rights has failed" [1984: 69]. 
That failure not withstanding, people justify their actions by claiming just such human 
rights. The notion of rights has become a minimalist ethic in American society. The failure 
of such claims can be traced to the same reason Kant’s formalism fails: even a rational 
presentation of the logic of such claims cannot instill the desire to obey such claims. Reason 
alone does not motivate most people. At best, it indicates what should be done; at worst, it 
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serves as a rationalization or mask for self-serving behavior. I return to this problem in 
Section 2.5 "On ethical relativism." 
2.3. On Utilitarianism 
The second major ethical system is that of utilitarianism [Mill, 1957, 1978]. In this ethical 
system, good involves determining the benefits and costs of an act to all who might be 
affected by that act. The right act is that one which yields the greatest happiness for the 
greatest number. As Kant suggested a theory of human nature based upon one’s sense of duty, 
so Mill developed a theory of human nature based upon one’s moral sophistication: 
Human beings have faculties more elevated than animal appetites and, when once 
made conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness which does not 
include their gratification.... 
Utilitarianism, therefore, could only attain its end by the general cultivation of 
nobleness of character, even if each individual were only benefited [sic] by the 
nobleness of others.... Mill [1957: 11,16] 
Mill refers to such elevated faculties as "noble feelings" which are qualitatively superior to the 
lower "animal appetites." It is within this context that enlightened self-interest takes on its 
connotations of moral maturity. 
Utilitarianism has a significant following within the business community. It is the moral 
equivalent of a cost/benefit analysis, weighing the relative positive and negative consequences 
of various acts then choosing the one with the highest positive return for all concerned. 
If MacIntyre faults Kantian formalism for misreading reason in human nature, he finds 
more fault with utilitarianism. He begins by exposing the problem of basing this theory on the 
concepts of pleasure or happiness as abstract concepts: 
... different pleasures and different happinesses are to a large degree incommen¬ 
surable: there are no scales of quality or quantity on which to weigh them.... 
To have understood the polymorphous character of pleasure and happiness is 
of course to have rendered those concepts useless for utilitarian purposes... it 
follows that the notion of the greatest happiness of the greatest number is a notion 
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without any clear content at all. It is indeed a pseudo-concept available for a 
variety of ideological uses, but no more than that [1984: 64]. 
As already noted, Mill presumes a "general cultivation of nobleness." He does not spell 
out what is required in this regard. Late 20th century America, however, does not automati¬ 
cally provide such cultivation; hence MacIntyre’s claim for the inevitable degeneration of 
utilitarianism. As an abstract ethical theory utilitarianism provides only abstract guidance. 
Without some social mechanism to enlighten individual character, utilitarianism becomes 
merely a rationale for "my" preferences. 
2.4. On Principle-Based Ethics (PBE) 
MacIntyre concludes that the concepts of "rights" and "utility" share a prim a facie 
usefulness which becomes intellectually insupportable when examined more closely: 
A central characteristic of moral fictions which comes clearly into view when 
we juxtapose the concept of utility to that of rights is now identifiable: they 
purport to provide us with an objective and impersonal criterion, but they do not.... 
The concept of rights was generated to serve one set of purposes as part of the 
social invention of the autonomous moral agent; the concept of utility was devised 
for quite another set of purposes. [1984: 70] 
Both formalism and utilitarianism depend on human reason to perceive a correct course of 
action (independent of the person’s own benefits) and both depend on human reason to supply 
sufficient motivation for the person to follow that morally correct path even if the individual 
might suffer personally. 
MacIntyre claims that this philosophical shift of the Enlightenment to PBE (formalism 
and utilitarianism) has failed. The first reason involves the inability of any description of 
timeless, universal, and a-historical imperatives to motivate human beings. Both systems fail 
in their assumption that human nature is rationally guided apart from social reinforcement 
and/or the development of other internal strengths to augment reason.This rationale explains 
the general dissatisfaction with business ethics set forth in Chapter 1. 
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Another major flaw with modem ethics involves their coexistence in spite of mutually 
exclusive claims. When presenting formalism and utilitarianism to a business ethics class, it is 
common to present both systems, and to contrast one with the other. Superficially, this makes 
sense: to determine whether an act is right, formalism centers on analyzing the means, utilitar¬ 
ianism centers on the ends. But this even-handed presentation often confuses the students. 
Attempts have been made to combine formalism and utilitarianism. Within the field of 
business ethics, key models are those of Brady [1985, 1988, 1990], Goodchild [1986], and 
Velasquez [1988; also Cavanagh, Moberg, & Velasquez, 1981; Velasquez, Moberg, & 
Cavanagh, 1983]. These models differ from one another, and no one model has ever emerged 
as dominant (as no one model has emerged from philosophers’ struggles with this issue). 
These deficiencies in PBE lead MacIntyre to a somewhat sympathetic treatment of the 
modem "rejection" of ethics: 
What the student is in consequence generally confronted with... is an apparent 
inconclusiveness in all argument outside the natural sciences, an inconclusiveness 
which seems to abandon him or her to his or her prerational preferences.... 
There is thus a deep incompatibility between the standpoint of any rational 
tradition of enquiry and the dominant modes of contemporary teaching, discussion, 
and debate.... [T]he standpoint of the forums of modem liberal culture 
presupposes the fiction of shared, even if unformulable, universal standards of 
rationality [MacIntyre, 1988: 400]. 
So both formalism and utilitarianism not only fail to provide useful moral guidance by 
themselves, they fail even more by providing a veneer of morality which actually masks 
"prerational preferences." They become smoke screens for ethically relative judgments. 
What, then, does MacIntyre see as the final result of such fictions? With the loss of a 
unifying philosophical tradition comes the loss of normative guidance. When one is free to 
choose which "universal" system is right and claim that the other "universal" systems are 
wrong, this person cannot provide convincing reasons to those in other camps as to why they 
should switch their allegiances. Further, when one "applies" his/her system, s/he often finds 
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that his/her conclusions differ from those using the same system! For someone looking at this 
situation, the incongruities can make all systems appear relative. Thus the very nature of 
PBE leads to the rise of the third ethical system: ethical relativism. 
2.5. On Ethical Relativism and Emotivism 
Both formalism and utilitarianism offer a theoretical basis for group-centered conduct 
There exists a third ethical system which may actually dominate behavior in the "real" world. 
This system is called ethical relativism. It involves the belief that the correctness of any moral 
judgment is relative to the individual (or group) making that judgment, and therefore one 
person cannot impose moral demands upon another. 
One popular form of ethical relativism is that of pragmatism. In its simplest form, "what¬ 
ever works is good." Classics for this position are those of Machiavelli [1975] and James 
[1907; for modem business applications: Carr, 1968; Jay, 1967; Giacalone & Knouse, 1990]. 
While relativism has received a more sophisticated defense at the epistemological level [cf. 
Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Burrell & Morgan, 1979], the consensus among business ethicists 
appears to be that ethical relativism is inadequate. Business ethicists have described ethical 
relativism as a form of myopia [cf. Gellerman, 1986; Davis, 1989] or simply an excuse for 
self-serving behavior [Mitchell & Scott, 1990]. Textbooks on business ethics almost uniformly 
condemn relativism as an inadequate ethical system [cf. Brady, 1990; Cavanagh, 1990; 
DeGeorge, 1990; Hosmer, 1991; Shaw & Barry, 1992]. 
MacIntyre contends that Western society has drifted beyond ethical relativism into 
emotivism, which is: 
[the] doctrine that all evaluative judgments and more specifically, all moral 
judgments are nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or 
feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in character [1984: 11-12]. 
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Emotivism is only the expression of personal preference, but it is not acknowledged as such. 
Rather than one person telling another, "I want you to do this," the first person phrases the 
issue as "You should do this" [cf. MacIntyre, 1984: 19]. In an emotivist culture, such phrasing 
projects a false morality (and objectivity) onto claims which are actually no more than 
expressions of personal preference. 
MacIntyre believes that modem (Enlightenment-based) ethical assertions rationalize 
preferences rather than posit rational morals. Worse, ethical relativism destroys any possibility 
of finding a true social moral consensus. Without such an ethical consensus to hold people 
together, the remaining alternative is one which is power based. When people are not bound 
by any morality other than their own preferences, and when they believe their particular 
"morality" is better than those held by others, then it is a small step to feeling justified in 
forcing others to conform via force. Such an imposition of an individual will upon others can 
be seen in such diverse events as Michael Milken’s casual defrauding of investors, the Los 
Angeles riots following the Rodney King verdict in 1992, illegal sit-ins by animal rights 
activists, and even the rise in violent crimes such as murder and rape. Each of these exemp¬ 
lifies the imposition of one person’s (or group’s) will upon others. An irony apparent here is 
that while society may be ethically relativist, many individuals and groups within society are 
absolutist about their particular beliefs, and these people are willing to impose these beliefs 
upon others. What happens then is the politicization of ethics. 
The philosophical version of such uses of force is the Nietzschean concept of the overman. 
The strongest will not only wins, but should win [Nietzsche, 1966; MacIntyre, 1984; note also 
Wangerin, 1990: 171, who claims that modem liberalism posits a "competitive model" based 
upon a model of self-interested human nature]. 
But even Nietzsche’s nihilism provides too systematic a theory. What has dominated the 
United States is a pragmatic form of emotivism. In his later work, MacIntyre presents this 
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situation as the culture of effectiveness [1988: 36ff]. Such a culture is based on a view of 
society which believes that society is no more than a collection of self-interested individuals 
who bargain with one another for mutual benefit. Even justice is the result of such bargaining. 
It "will always be as if justice was the outcome of a contract..." [1988: 36]. Politics, in turn, 
will not be an Aristotelian ideal of maximizing shared understanding, but the basis for 
resolving conflicts of interest. Given this position, one final consequence deserves our notice. 
As MacIntyre puts it: 
What is the key to the social content of emotivism? It is the fact that emotivism 
entails the obliteration of any genuine distinction between manipulative and non- 
manipulative social relations.... 
If emotivism is true.... The sole reality of distinctively moral discourse is the 
attempt of one will to align the attitudes, feelings, preference and choices of 
another with its own. Others are always means, never ends [1984: 23-24]. 
This emphasis on effectiveness involves a focus on the means to realize a goal, not on the 
value of the goal itself. "Success" becomes defined in terms of the achieving, not of the 
worthiness of the achievement itself. Kant’s Categorical Imperative- which he himself 
restates as respecting persons as ends, not means— becomes meaningless in practice. Effective 
manipulation of others becomes the only relevant criterion, without any reference to ethical 
norms [see Brief & Aldag, 1981 for an example of such a view]. 
The final irony of emotivism is that it is not recognized as such. People who talk with 
"shoulds" and "should nots" believe they are truly proclaiming universal and self-evident 
truths, or they promote the coexistence of incompatible claims under the rubric of "pluralism." 
Waterman [1988] talks of this as "moral irrationalism." The moral language which typifies 
emotivism masks the true situation for both speaker and hearer. 
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2.6. On Business Ethics 
2.6.1. The Ethic of Effectiveness 
Mulligan [1987] faults schools of management for excluding ethical issues because of their 
exclusive focus on empirical study. Others [e.g. Bellah, 1985; Brady, 1986; Fritzsche & 
Becker, 1984; Jansen & Von Glinow, 1985; Keeley, 1983] support the contention that business 
ethics does not receive the priority it deserves within academic circles. This low priority may 
be partly due to the repeated stress on profit maximization and the technical aspects of 
business education. Further, it may be partly due to the emphasis on the social sciences within 
the business disciplines at the expense of such humanities as ethics. But, as suggested in this 
paper, the problem may also be due to weaknesses inherent within the business ethics curricula 
itself. MacIntyre offers further consideration of this possibility. 
Since most of the work in business ethics rests upon the PBE of formalism and/or utilitar¬ 
ianism, along with some derivatives such as justice [Rawls, 1971] and equity theory [Gould, 
1979; Thibaut & Walker, 1975], MacIntyre claims that business ethics will fail to provide 
useful guidance in just the same way that the philosophical approaches to ethics fail. In his 
explanation of the inadequacy of reason, MacIntyre provides a rationale for the failure of 
business ethics courses to shape the behavior of students. 
As set forth so far, MacIntyre shows that both formalism and utilitarianism offer a rational 
veneer to emotivism. When people base their ethical beliefs on an emotivist conviction that 
morality is nothing but the contrived compromise of conflicting personal preferences then not 
only do formal ethical systems mask this cynical view, but they also provide a cloak for 
manipulative acts by portraying such acts as part of the bargaining process. 
This shift into bargaining provides a good point to shift from society in general to business 
in particular, from ethics in general to business ethics in particular. Much of the material 
presented in this section could be reworded to be part of the preceding sections. But 
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MacIntyre finds that Western business practices explicitly manifest the ethical anomalies 
described in this section. 
Interestingly, he first introduces business ethics in connection with bureaucratic structures: 
...bureaucratic structures, which whether in the form of private corporations or of 
government agencies, define the working tasks of so many of our 
contemporaries.... the organization is characteristically engaged in a competitive 
struggle for scarce resources to put to the service of its predetermined ends. It is 
therefore a central responsibility of managers to direct and redirect their 
organizations’ available resources, both human and non-human, as effectively as 
possible toward those ends. Bureaucratic rationality is the rationality of matching 
means to ends economically and efficiently [1984: 25]. 
MacIntyre traces this emphasis on means over ends to Max Weber: 
Weber’s thought embodies just those dichotomies which emotivism embodies, and 
obliterates just those distinctions to which emotivism has to be blind. Questions of 
ends are questions of values, and on values reason is silent; conflict between rival 
values cannot be rationally settled.... the choice of any one particular evaluative 
stance or commitment can be no more rational than that of any other.... The 
consequence of Weber’s emotivism is that in his thought the contrast between 
power and authority, although paid lip-service to, is effectively obliterated as a 
special instance of the disappearance of the contrast between manipulative and 
non-manipulative social relations.... For on Weber’s view no type of authority can 
appeal to rational criteria to vindicate itself except that type of bureaucratic 
authority which appeals precisely to its own effectiveness. And what this appeal 
reveals is that bureaucratic authority is nothing other than successful power [1984: 
26]. 
This Weberian position appears utilitarian, but the determination of utility is based upon the 
pragmatic accomplishment of relatively narrow benefits. These benefits, in turn, are judged to 
be valuable on the basis of managerial preferences (cf. the definition of emotivism). 
Since utilitarianism is consequentialist, it is logical for managers to concern themselves 
with effectiveness. "Getting the job done" and "the bottom line" reflect ends which must be 
accomplished to have any utility at all. 
But this managerial emphasis on effectiveness comes into conflict with our society s 
emphasis on rights: 
For what I described earlier as the culture of bureaucratic individualism results in 
their characteristic overt political debates being between an individualism which 
makes its claims in terms of rights and forms of bureaucratic organization which 
make their claims in terms of utility. But if the concept of rights and that of 
utility are a matching pair of incommensurable fictions, it will be the case that the 
moral idiom employed can at best provide a semblance of rationality for the 
modem political process, but not its reality. The mock rationality of the debate 
conceals the arbitrariness of the will and power at work in its resolution. 
It is easy also to understand why protest becomes a distinctive moral fixture 
of the modem age and why indignation is a predominant modem emotion.... 
But protest is now almost entirely that negative phenomenon which 
characteristically occurs as a reaction to the alleged invasion of someone’s rights 
in the name of someone else’s utility.... the utterance of protest is characteristically 
addressed to those who already share the protestors’ premises [1984: 71; emphases 
his]. 
Both "utility" and "rights" have become emotivist, with the resulting loss of any positive basis 
for community. 
To summarize this section so far, MacIntyre finds that business ethics, as it shares the 
weaknesses of utilitarian ethics, actually facilitates an emotivist denial of the ability to make 
normative claims. But businesses have found a substitute ethical base in the concept of 
effectiveness. As long as one is effective at accomplishing a goal, one is good. The only 
external standard which appears to relate to this "ethic of effectiveness" approach is that of the 
market. What one earns (either individually or corporately) is the measure of success. This 
measure of success holds regardless of the product or service being rendered.1 
Many in business might challenge MacIntyre’s choice of terms. "Effectiveness" carries 
strong positive connotations within the business communities, both practicing and academic. 
The very rationale for the existence of businesses— and managers— is to "get the job done. 
But this is just MacIntyre’s point: what job? Without a coherent ethical rationale for 
justifying the particular business activity, then "effectiveness" alone cannot be enough. People 
1. This may appear to be an extreme claim. Friedman [1982] limits the pursuit of profit to the 
"rules of the game" which preclude deception and fraud. But as shown by Jackall [1988] and 
more directly by Lewis [1989], such a self-centered perspective can lead to extremes. 
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can be effective at bad jobs. Galbraith [1984] explored this idea as he considered the shift in 
American policy from producing products to producing employment. 
Such a separation of means from ends results in an interesting dynamic. If business 
persons define "good" based on effective achievement apart from some type of internal or 
intrinsic worth in their activities, then how does one measure such good? In our capitalistic 
culture, market competition provides such a measure. 
MacIntyre develops the idea of competition in the Greek term for "contest", agon.1 Orig¬ 
inally, the agon was an arena in which people could strive for excellence. Competition was a 
spur to better performance. But in this context one could lose the race to another and still win 
by setting a "personal best" But when external winning becomes the only measure of good, 
the nature of the contest changes. Competition becomes a win/lose contest in which personal 
excellence ceases to be the primary goal. In the business arena material success defines 
winning (profit/market share for the corporation, personal wealth/power for the individual). 
Such external standards of good push people towards acquisitiveness (pleonexia) and away 
from the internal standard of personal satisfaction for doing a job well. Accumulating wealth 
becomes an external sign of victory, and overwhelms the intrinsic motivation of doing the job 
well for its own sake. [Deci, 1975, notes how external rewards can destroy internal 
motivation; see also Deci & Ryan, 1985, 1987; for the profit motive as "abstract greed," see 
Solomon, 1993.] 
The twisting of the agon and the rise of pleonexia are essentially self-centered. They mark 
the loss of one’s perception of role within society, a putting of self above others. MacIntyre 
sees such self-centered perspectives as characteristic marks of the modem business world 
1. TABLE 2 in Chapter 3 provides a glossary of Greek terms used in this study. 
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[1984: 137-138, 196]. The ethic of effectiveness becomes, to use Mitchell & Scott’s [1990] 
term, "the ethic of personal advantage." 
2.62. The Ethic of Excellence 
MacIntyre offers an alternative in the "ethics of excellence," which he calls virtue-based 
ethics. TABLE 1 summarizes the contrast between the ethic of excellence and the ethic of 
effectiveness. While Chapter 3 develops the VBE in detail, I will comment on the four 
categories used here. The variables of the two systems relate to the factors which "count" in 
TABLE 1 
Excellence v. Effectiveness 
EXCELLENCE EFFECTIVENESS 
variables: excellence 
virtue (arete) 
effectiveness 
utility 
ethical foci: community 
role 
education (socialization) 
self 
reason (desire) 
innate 
referents: character 
telos/fulfillment 
internal 
personal best 
actions 
winning 
external 
contest (agon) 
language: cooperation 
good/bad 
competition 
strong/weak 
decision-making. Excellence and virtue here are used in the Aristotelian meanings of these 
terms. Effectiveness and utility are again used with MacIntyre’s emphasis on how these terms 
have degenerated in modem usage. The ethical foci refer to the bases from which individuals 
evaluate the worth of various alternatives. VBE suggests an emphasis on one s role within the 
community, a role which is acquired through education. This idea is linked to virtues by the 
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fact that virtues enable one to fill a role well. By contrast, MacIntyre suggests modem 
business persons view decisions as emerging from one’s own innate insights, independent of 
any larger social context. So the idea of ethical foci deals not only with where people get 
their ethical insights, but what objects they use as bases for evaluating alternatives. This 
communitarian/individualistic dichotomy, in turn, can be seen in its resultant referents. VBE 
centers on the issues of one’s character and purpose in life, while the business alternative is 
based on an external evaluation of who has "won." These referents for basing decisions are 
either internal or external. Thus people with an ethic of excellence define issues in terms of 
who they are while people relying upon an ethic of effectiveness concentrate on what they can 
get (win). Finally, this dichotomy is reflected in the very language of the individuals. People 
with an ethic of excellence tend to emphasize cooperation and talk using a normative frame of 
reference (good/bad) while people with an ethic of effectiveness emphasize competition and 
talk using a power-based frame of reference (strong/weak.) 
Piliavin & Chamg [1990: 33] make several of these connections, notably that competitors 
think in terms of "strong-weak" while cooperators conceptualize issues in terms of "good-bad." 
They go on to link altruistic motivation with a sense of empathy, which cooperation would 
foster: 
It seems, then, that the perception of differences in altruism leads to an 
individualistic solution, namely, "I’m going to get mine," in a highly individual- 
oriented country, the United States, and to a collective solution in a more socialist 
society, the Netherlands [1990: 52-53]. 
Beggan, Messick, & Allison [1988] and Liebrand, Jansen, Rijken, & Suhre [1986] document 
the basic research in this area of "might over morality." Wangerin addresses the particular 
dilemma facing the individual who would be moral: 
Role differentiation problems almost necessarily arise for professional people who 
work in societal institutions based on the competitive model, systems such as ... 
those involving adversary justice, laissez-faire economics, and political pluralism. 
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That is so because institutions based on the competitive model do not line up with 
commonly accepted moral norms. [1990: 176-177] 
MacIntyre’s concept of an ethical dichotomy for business persons may appear simplistic. 
One might challenge his claims that both formalism and utilitarianism inevitably degenerate 
into ethical relativism or emotivism. For example, a manager might hold to a utilitarian 
philosophy in the best sense set forth by Mill. Such a position would then fit somewhere 
between excellence and effectiveness. But such middle ground is not part of MacIntyre’s 
framework. The purpose of this present work is to set forth MacIntyre’s position and then to 
see whether or not it can be empirically verified. The methodology used for such testing is set 
forth in the following chapter. 
TABLE 1 provides a framework for the managerial scenario and corresponding set of Q 
items used in this study (and explained in Chapter 4). But first we need to develop 
MacIntyre’s concept of virtue-based ethics. To that alternative paradigm we now turn. 
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CHAPTER 3 
VIRTUE-BASED ETHICS AND BUSINESS 
Chapter 2 developed MacIntyre’s critique of the PBE which dominates American society 
and American business. Chapter 3 presents his Virtue-Based Ethics alternative and applies it 
to business (Section 3.1). Section 3.2 links MacIntyre’s work to extant business literature on 
managerial roles and role conflicts. 
Sections 3.3 and 3.4 set the stage for an empirical study by reviewing the problems related 
to any attempt to study business ethics in general and MacIntyre’s predictions in particular. 
The Chapter concludes with a hypothesis and research question. 
3.1. MacIntyre’s Development of Virtue-Based Ethics (VBE) 
The concept of the agon, the contest, is not negative in itself. For the virtuous person, an 
agon provides an opportunity to excel in comparison to one’s own standard. Doing one’s best 
(which can be stirred on by others in the contest) is the measure of success or failure. 
Although one’s best will often result in the winning of an agon, so that personal excellence 
and effectiveness often coincide, the two are not necessarily connected to each other. The key 
here is that excellence involves an internal standard which is socially approved. The opposite 
extreme is the purely external standard of winning. While effectiveness need not be limited to 
the latter, without a clear sense of community and virtues, the stress on effectiveness defaults 
to that externally based perspective of winning. 
The ethic of excellence offers a fundamental alternative to winning. As MacIntyre uses 
the term, excellence involves an awareness of one’s roles within society. Further, these roles 
i 
constrain the individual to a basic integrity: one must fill these roles well in order to benefit 
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the society. Personal gain (winning) becomes secondary within such a group-centered focus. 
This alternative is seen in the works of Aristotle [1962, 1985]. 
Developing Aristotelian themes for the modem age, MacIntyre returns several times to the 
concept of roles. He sets the stage for Aristotle by going back to the age of the heroic society. 
[In Homeric society] every individual has a given role and status within a well- 
defined and highly determinate system of roles and statuses. The key structures 
are those of kinship and of the household. In such a society a man knows who he 
is by knowing his role in these structures; and in knowing this he knows also what 
he owes and what is owed to him by the occupant of every other role and status.... 
... the virtues just are those qualities which sustain a free man in his role and 
which manifest themselves in those actions which his role requires.... 
Identity in heroic society involves particularity and accountability. I am 
answerable for doing or failing to do what anyone who occupies my role owes to 
others and this accountability terminates only with death.... [1984: 122,126] 
MacIntyre himself relates this material to our times: 
... what we have to learn from heroic societies is twofold: first that all morality is 
always to some degree tied to the socially local and particular and that the 
aspirations of the morality of modernity to a universality freed from particularity is 
an illusion; and secondly that there is no way to possess the virtues except as part 
of a tradition in which we inherit them and our understanding of them from a 
series of predecessors in which series heroic societies hold first place [1984: 126- 
n 
Here are the three fundamental components of the VBE paradigm: community, roles, and 
virtues. Community provides the moral foundation, not the individual. This group-centered 
focus stands in contrast to the self-centered focus prevalent in ethical relativism. Support for a 
group-centered focus can be found in the literature on psychological moral development 
[Kegan, 1982; Kohlberg, 1981, 1984; Rest, 1979, 1986; Sampson, 1989; Weber, 1989]. 
The fundamental link between the community and the individual is the role. One s role 
provides the individual with an identity and presents that individual a set of moral obligations 
to serve the community within that role. Inasmuch as the role is a communal assignment, the 
community provides both formal and informal support to the individual to help this person 
meet such moral obligations. 
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Finally, virtues enable one to fulfill the role’s demands. Certain virtues, such as courage, 
integrity, obedience, and selflessness may attach to all roles. (MacIntyre does not develop any 
extensive list of relevant virtues. Rachels [1993: 163] offers one such set. Desjardins [1984] 
and Solomon [1993] develop sets of virtues particularly relevant to the role of manager.) 
The Greek word for virtue is arete. It’s basic connotation is that of excellence, or some¬ 
thing done well. Throwing a perfect strike in baseball is a form of arete, as is building a 
better mousetrap, as is doing the right thing in a strictly moral sense (hence the other meaning 
of virtue). Essential to each of these examples is the intrinsic worth of the accomplishment, 
not the external consequences of the act. The Greek term for good, agathos, originally meant 
good in one’s role. These Greek terms are among those listed in the Glossary of TABLE 2. 
TABLE 2 
Glossary of Greek Terms 
agathos: 
agon: 
arete: 
eudaimonia: 
hesuchia: 
phronesis: 
pleonexia: 
polis: 
sophrosune: 
telos: 
(originally) to be good at doing what one’s role requires; Oater) good 
the contest 
excellence (in doing something well); virtue 
blessedness, happiness, prosperity; being well and doing well 
peacefulness of spirit after a job well done 
practical wisdom; claiming what is rightfully yours 
acquisitiveness (a vice) 
city (basic social unit of community in time of Aristotle) 
the non-abuse of power 
an end or goal, which includes a connotation of completion or fulfillment 
(MacIntyre, 1984, 1988) 
These concepts of role and virtue find a fuller development in Aristotle and the city-state 
of Athens. In this period, the Greek thinkers focused less on the glories of conflict and more 
on the necessities of coexistence. "A.W.H. Adkins has usefully contrasted the cooperative 
with the competitive virtues. The competitive he sees as Homeric in their ancestry; the 
cooperative represent the social world of the Athenian democracy" [1984: 131; Adkins, I960], 
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These cooperative virtues intertwine with Aristotle’s view of human nature. This nature 
includes a telos, an end or goal, which includes a connotation of completion or fulfillment. 
Every activity, every enquiry, every practice aims at some good; for by ’the 
good’ or ’a good’ we mean that at which human beings characteristically aim.... 
Human beings, like the members of all other species, have a specific nature; and 
that nature is such that they have certain aims and goals, such that they move by 
nature towards a specific telos.... 
What then does the good for man turn out to be? Aristotle... gives it the 
name of eudaimonia-- as so often there is a difficulty in translation: blessedness, 
happiness, prosperity. It is the state of being well and doing well in being well, of 
a man’s being well-favored himself and in relation to the divine.... 
The virtues are precisely those qualities the possession of which will enable 
an individual to achieve eudaimonia and the lack of which will frustrate his 
movement towards the telos [1984: 148]. 
Elsewhere, MacIntyre [1984: 199] explains that a virtue (aret|) is not only a "what", but a 
"why" as well. It is in the nature of a virtue that it motivates as well as directs the person. 
Thus a virtue is a special type of sentiment, with both cognitive and affective content. There 
is an intrinsic pleasure in being virtuous, in doing the right thing. The pitcher enjoys throwing 
the strike for its own sake, rather than just beating the batter. The inventor finds pleasure in 
creating, apart from any monetary rewards which might result from the patent and sale of the 
mousetrap. These concepts of telos and arete, when lived over a lifetime, lead to eudaimonia. 
But in the shorter term, they lead to hesuchia, a satisfaction arising from a job done well. 
Relating virtues to one’s role gives the person a different perspective on power. Power is 
not for personal aggrandizement, but for fulfilling one’s obligations. This perspective can be 
found in the virtue of sophrosune, the non-abuse of power. Deci’s [1975] work on intrinsic 
motivation approaches this concept. Argyris [1957] also makes the connection between one’s 
role and personal development through that role. 
The concepts of telos and eudaimonia alter the concept of ethics. Whereas a modem 
definition of ethics might be "a systematic consideration of values," Aristotle uses ethics to 
show how virtues are those character traits which lead to the telos of eudaimonia. Thus one 
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gets an education in virtues to live a better life. This emphasis on education/socialization 
stands in contrast to the PBE emphasis on innate reason. Some virtues, called intellectual 
virtues, can be taught in academic settings. Other virtues, called the character virtues, have to 
be lived to be learned [cf. Nystrom & Starbuck, 1984, on the interrelationship of belief and 
behavior]. Something of this type of a virtuous life (or a good life) is found in modem uses 
of the term integrity. For example, Argyris & Schon [1988: 197] define integrity as "1. being 
complete, unbroken 2. sound moral principle, uprightness." Both aspects of this definition 
apply to this Aristotelian model. 
VBE works from the premise that character is the underlying source of behavior. When 
one has arete, then one lives according to those virtues, and acts them out in a habit of right 
actions. Good persons have a practical wisdom (Greek: phronesis) which they use to choose 
among alternative actions those acts most congment with their virtues and most beneficial to 
the community. 
A person’s telos relates intimately to the roles s/he holds. Every member of the polis 
(city) has a basic role as a member of the community. This membership is so basic to the 
Greek’s concept of identity that the Greek word for someone who would abandon his/her 
community to "go it alone" is idios. From this word comes the English word "idiot." While 
the specific meaning has been lost, the connotation was the same back then as it is now: an 
idiot was/is crazy. The Greeks viewed "roles" on a larger scale than one finds in the modem 
literature of organizational behavior. Each person had specific roles (craftsman, soldier, 
scholar) and all had generic roles such as citizen and person. 
Virtues were intrinsically connected to roles, and not some separate set of values. Thus 
Rokeach’s terminal and instrumental values [1973: 28; cf. Miceli & Castleffanchi, 1989] may 
parallel the concepts of telos and arete. VBE presents a way of life as well as indicating the 
proper end of that life. Noteworthy is the long-term perspective of this system. A life can be 
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considered happy only when viewed as a whole, weighing the goods and bads throughout. 
This fits well with the theme throughout business ethics that morality involves a long tenm 
perspective [Cavanagh, 1990; DeGeorge, 1990; Hosmer, 1991]. 
3.2. VBE as a Model for Business Ethics 
Brady [1990: 12ff.] discusses morality in terms of doing, being, and knowing. In the first 
category he considers reasons for acting morally, including issues of causality, situational vari¬ 
ables and developmental theories of Kohlberg and others. In the second, he cites Aristotle and 
the concept of virtues, noting that "the language of virtues has been ignored in the field of 
business ethics" [see Sarachek, 1968, for one notable exception]. In the third, he presents the 
conventional approach of modem ethical theories. Brady’s taxonomy allows for VBE, but 
only as an intermediate step. Within the VBE paradigm, Brady’s second and third categories 
might be reversed: "being" provides the ultimate rationale for the "doing." 
Using VBE as a model of business ethics offers several advantages. The three major 
components of VBE- community, roles, and virtues- readily cross over to the domain of 
organizational studies. 
MacIntyre’s observation that morality is "socially local and particular" [1984: 126-7] 
relates to the relevant roles held by the person within a particular organization; the tradition is 
carried in culture, both societal and organizational. In some ways, the business organization 
might be a better representative of a community than American society as a whole. In terms 
of size and group focus, the business organization more closely approximates Aristotle’s polis 
than does American society as a whole. Boatright notes: 
An important aspect of this model is the recognition that a corporation is also a 
human community, a group of persons working together for some common end. 
Aristotle observes in the Politics that ’every community is established with a view 
to some good,’ and any organized activity requires that there be a set of rules or 
established expectations to guide each person’s behavior. [1988: 307-308] 
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Much of the work on participative management [Argyris, 1955; Sashkin, 1984, 1986] stresses 
the role which the modem business organization plays in providing community and meaning 
for the organizational member. Solomon [1993] recommends "family" as a metaphor for the 
communal nature of the organization. 
FIGURE 1 illustrates the interconnectedness among society1, the person, and the organi¬ 
zation. In the simple view of Figure l.a, the person identifies primarily with the organization. 
The organization in turn has a role within society. Many texts on business ethics often 
present issues in this way: ethical issues relate to the business as an entity and to that entity’s 
social roles. The individual’s place in this equation is distorted. While CEO’s and senior 
SOCIETY 
> 
> 
ORGANIZATION 
> 
> 
s 
t 
PERSON 
Figure l.a: 
(Simple Model) 
Figure l.b: 
(Complex Model) 
FIGURE 1 
The S-O-P Model: Society, Organizations & Persons 
1. "Society," as used in this dissertation, typically refers to the social group within a nation¬ 
state. The earlier use of "American society" reflects such a usage. The local community presents 
a segment of that society. I present two caveats to this term society. First, "government" is a 
only a segment of society, albeit a significant one. Secondly, the term society is flexible enough 
to cover even larger groupings such as "Western culture" or even "humankind." 
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managers may be concerned with plant closings and pollution (to pick two relevant topics) 
most middle and junior level managers do not normally deal with such issues in their normal 
routines. The ethical conflicts which these managers face are more limited (e.g. personal 
compromise of ethical principles and the ethics involved in changing subordinates). But such 
issues typically are not addressed. 
This simplistic model leaves a moral vacuum. Business persons learn that competition is 
the basis of capitalism, and managers have a fiduciary interest in helping their companies 
maximize profit. But without any other source of normative guidance, such managers concen¬ 
trate only on their roles within the organization, and work to win. Winning (or effectiveness) 
isn’t everything, it’s the only thing. Solomon [1993: 26-31] develops the various metaphors 
relevant to such a view, including business as jungle, battle, and game. Using such metaphors 
along with their emphases on winning weakens (or even obliterates) the managers’ overriding 
responsibilities to society. 
In the complex model of Figure l.b, the individual has not only organizational roles, but 
direct social ones. Thus a manager is also a citizen, with direct responsibilities to both 
communities (organization and society). For VBE, the concept of roles incorporates all three 
relationships. The individual person must evaluate the ethics of the organization’s role within 
society and his/her own role within the organization in terms of his/her social role. The 
ethically relevant community is society [see Dale, I960]. When the person benefits society by 
doing a good job in a beneficial organization, then the roles are ethically congruent [cf. 
Frederick, 1992a; Vogel, 1991]. 
Giving the person a specific social role limits the significance of competition. Societies 
are essentially cooperative, not competitive. Etzioni addresses this issue in his group-centered 
approach to ethics. He presents an "I&We" model in which competition must be 
"encapsulated": 
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...the I&We [sic] paradigm sees competition, the market, indeed the economy, as a 
subsystem nestled within a more encompassing societal context. And it assumes 
that competition is not self-sustaining; its very existence, as well as the scope of 
transactions organized by it, is dependent to a significant extent upon the 
contextual factors, the societal "capsule," within which competition takes place. 
[Etzioni, 1988: 199] 
VBE’s emphases on community, roles, and virtues suggests a natural link to organizational 
studies. Organizations are communities which define the roles of their members. The 
concept of roles has a significant history within organizational behavior. Katz & Kahn [1978] 
devote several chapters to it. Significant work exists linking organizational roles with self- 
concept and self-esteem. Examples include Ashforth & Mael [1989] and Peirce, Gardner, 
Cummings, & Dunham [1989]. Greenhaus & Beutell [1985] specifically link the growth of 
one’s career sub-identity as significantly impacting one’s personal identity. Brief & 
Motowidlo [1986] relate the role which organizational climate can play in fostering a sense of 
empathy and encouraging prosocial behavior. This concept of organizational influence on the 
individual is Aristotelian in its stress on the larger organization giving meaning to the 
individual. VBE contributes to the role concept first in relating the person’s business role to 
both the person’s and the organization’s social roles. Further, it provides a rationale for 
discussing role obligations not simply in psychological, but in moral terms as well. 
In a similar vein, virtues relate closely to values and norms, which in turn have received 
much attention within the realm of organizational studies [Allport, Vernon, & Linzey, 1960; 
Barnett & Karson, 1989; England, 1967; England, Dhingra, & Agarwal, 1974; Enz, 1988; 
Lusk & Oliver, 1974; Miceli & Castlefranchi, 1989; Rokeach, 1973]. Waterman highlights the 
dual role played by the concept of norms: 
For psychologists, norms refer to patterns or traits taken to be typical (average) for 
particular social groups. Norms are thus descriptive statements of what is being 
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done. For philosophers, norms are standards of conduct or ethical value, principles 
of right action. Norms, here, are imperative statements of what we should do 
[1988: 283]. 
Organizational culture often impacts the moral convictions of organizational members. 
Liedtka [1989] addresses the congruence between the individual’s values and those of the 
organization. She considers whether personal and organizational value systems are harmonious 
(congruent) or ambiguous. The conflicting values of moral behavior and profit maximization 
illustrate an ambiguous organizational value set. So do the individual’s values of wanting to 
do the right thing yet simultaneously wanting to do "whatever it takes to get ahead". When a 
particular value set is congruent, it exerts more influence upon the individual. This holds 
whether that value set is moral or immoral. Of particular interest here is the way in which a 
personal ambiguity weakens the individual’s position to evaluate and/or resist the organi¬ 
zation’s value system. Liedtka notes the case of managers who see themselves as "caring" 
persons, yet feel the need to accomplish clearly defined managerial tasks [1989: 809]. 
This subject of organizational culture also ties in well to virtue-based ethics, as values play 
a key role in defining such a culture and the socialization processes associated with it [Jones, 
1983, 1986; Pascale, 1985; Schein, 1968, 1985, 1990; Wiener, 1988]. Jansen & Von Glinow 
[1985] note the problems of ethical ambivalence within organizations, and how these give rise 
to "countemorms" which promote unethical behavior. Just as the person’s social role presents 
an ethical standard against which the organizational role can be evaluated, so one’s social 
obligations present a standard against which the organizational culture and the organization s 
socialization processes can be evaluated. 
In a related vein, structural factors should play a significant role in shaping members 
priorities along this excellence/effectiveness continuum. Kerr’s [1975] classic article On the 
folly of rewarding A while hoping for B" presents an example of such an influence. Kerr 
writes from an ethically neutral position, pointing out ways in which managers reinforce 
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undesired behaviors in the ways reward systems work. An example which specifically focuses 
on morality can be found in Matthews, Goodpaster, & Nash [1991] in the "Heinz A-C" cases. 
Here a moral code is formally espoused but the reward system actually motivates senior 
managers to violate that code. 
Such evaluations do not come automatically. Aristotle stressed the need for education to 
develop these sensitivities. MacIntyre reiterates this need for education. In particular, he 
stresses the need to be aware of the ethical tradition and the vision implicit in this. One’s 
telos is linked to both society and the organization: these interrelationships need to be shared. 
MacIntyre’s language here fits well with Kahn’s [1990] call for an integrative approach which 
incorporates conversation, history, vision, and community. 
O’Toole [1991] observes that individual virtue is most forthcoming in supportive 
organizational environments. In a similar manner, unsupportive environments can discourage 
virtues-- or psychological growth. Kelly’s [1987, 1988] work on the Destructive Achiever as 
well as Kets de Vries & Miller [1986] on the neurotic manager are but two examples of such 
non-supportive environments. 
Organizational members already incorporate personal ethics in considering role conflicts. 
Lichtman & Hunt present three ways in which individuals deal with such conflicts: 
* a moral orientation, in which the individual evaluates the legitimacy of the 
organization’s demands 
* an expedient orientation, in which the individual only considers external sanctions 
* a moral expedient orientation, in which the individual considers both the legitimacy 
of the demands and the external sanctions [1971: 290] 
The expedient orientation is the approach described by Jackall [1988], Mitchell & Scott 
[1990], and even more cynically by Lewis [1989]. But if managers do indeed wrestle with 
such problems, then the moral expedient approach can be suggested as the dominant method 
for dealing with such demands. Lichtman & Hunt [1971] are not alone in linking morality and 
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role conflicts. Dozier & Miceli [1985] note that moral conflicts are a form of role conflict 
This role conflict typifies the dilemma in business ethics set forth by Kahn: 
[In business ethics] two general categories of concepts are prominent... Some 
concepts focus on how individuals "ought" to behave, given normative standards 
and justifications of morality.... 
Other concepts focus on the contexts of ethical and unethical behavior. These 
concepts include, for example, organizational climate... and bureaucratic 
properties... and the ensuing role ambiguity and conflict.... Some researchers use 
such concepts to explore the influence of organizations on people’s norms... 
Ethics researchers have spoken of the need to bridge the gap between 
normative and contextual concepts and, more generally between prescriptive and 
descriptive research.... What is missing is the intersection of the two circles [of a 
Venn diagram], the shaded area in which concepts and methods are created that 
reflect both normative and contextual understandings and, ultimately, that connect 
academic research to organizational practice [1990: 312-313]. 
The paradigm of VBE offers a coherent framework from which to develop the connections 
between organization, roles, and virtues. It stresses the interconnection between professional 
and personal identity. Particularly when the relation of the community to its parts is 
addressed, it offers an approach which recognizes the embeddedness of the smaller group 
within the larger, and the obligations which that entails. 
Throughout this chapter, support has been given for two radically different views of 
business priorities. On the one hand is an adversarial model based on competition and the 
agon. In this model, business persons measure success in terms of effectiveness which is 
externally determined. This is the ethic of effectiveness. On the other hand is a more 
cooperative model based upon the innate relationships of the individual within the larger 
group. In this second model, business persons measure success in terms of personal 
"excellence" (or virtue) which is internally determined. Tins is the ethic of excellence. While 
excellence and effectiveness are not mutually exclusive, they do appear to embody 
fundamental antipathies. TABLE 1 summarized these distinctions. Is it possible that an 
excellence/effectiveness dichotomy or continuum exists? 
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3.3. Problems in Business Ethics Research 
Before presenting a specific hypothesis based on MacIntyre’s work, two additional topics 
require consideration. These topics relate to the study of business ethics in general and to the 
study of MacIntyre’s predictions in particular. This section looks at the former problem while 
the following section presents the latter. 
As noted in Chapter 1, much of business ethics lacks a theoretical base. This concern 
plays a dominant role in reviews of research in this field. Derry & Green [1989] lament the 
naive way business ethicists gloss over theoretical incompatibilities between formalist and 
utilitarian ethics. In the specific realm of research, Derry notes that we need to listen to how 
managers themselves conceive of ethics [1989: 856]. 
A major concern in business ethics relates to social desirability (SD) bias. SD bias is an 
inclination to report what one "should" do, even if one knows that is not how one actually 
acts. When studying cognitive perceptions of situations and predictions of behavior, SD bias 
can seriously distort subjects’ responses. But since unethical behavior is a low base-rate 
phenomenon [Trevino, 1992], observing true field behavior is difficult. Jackall [1998] took 
great pains to get past this bias. Randall & Gibson [1990] present an in depth discussion of 
this topic. Fernandes & Randall [1992] note that SD bias attenuates the results of ethics 
research. This appears to hold true even when anonymity is guaranteed. 
Insofar as VBE is relatively new as a theory in business ethics, empirical study is only 
beginning. Liedtka [1992] suggests that personal interviews are most appropriate in such early 
stages, and cites Rosen [1991] in his claim that correct understanding is more important than 
predictive reliability. In particular, such preliminary research should clearly delineate 
theoretical concepts and validate empirical constructs which are used in the actual research 
[Frederick, 1992; Randall & Gibson, 1900; Trevino, 1992; Weber, 1992]. 
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But interviews offer some difficulty when used as the primary means of research. First, 
anecdotal data lack generalizability. Second, interview analysis is much more qualitative than 
quantitative. Such problems may be reduced by the use of vignettes and scenarios. One 
classic in this area is the work of Fritzche & Becker [1984]. They used five scenarios, a 
Likert scale for responses, and open ended questions to triangulate on ethic systems used by 
managerial subjects. Randall & Gibson [1990], Trevino [1992], and Weber [1992] cite this 
work as a positive example in the use of scenarios in research. Randall & Gibson, however, 
cite the need for more realistic scenarios if this method is to reflect more accurately the 
situations faced by business managers. 
Fritzsche [1987] suggests that managers weigh the significance of ethical issues. Jones 
[1991] supports this idea and develops it into a contingency theory in which moral intensity 
becomes a relevant variable in analyzing ethical dilemmas. These concerns, too, should be 
incorporated into any research on ethical systems. 
Trevino [1992] considers experimentation more appropriate for theory building than field 
studies. She cites three forms of experimentation which work well when studying business 
ethics: scenarios, in-basket exercises, and simulations. Scenarios can have data systematically 
varied within them: the researcher then looks for systematic changes in the dependent variables 
[see Trevino & Victor, 1992: 127-129; they also cite Fritzche & Becker’s work as an example 
of experimentation using varied scenarios]. 
The final difficulty in considering an empirical study of business ethics relates to the many 
variables which might influence such cognitions. MacIntyre suggests issues of character play 
a role. But so do the influence of superiors, peers, friends, the perceived seriousness of the 
issue, and identification with the firm. Reichers [1985] takes this identification issues even 
further, suggesting that each person has multiple identifications within and beyond the firm. 
Distinguishing specific independent variables can be difficult. 
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From the discussion presented here, the reader can see that any treatment of business 
ethics must take a contingency approach. VBE itself is a contingency model with its emphasis 
on the community, roles, and virtues (or, more to the point here: the individual who possesses 
these virtues). But as a paradigm for business ethics, VBE is only in an early stage of 
theoretical development, with no empirical studies to support its contentions. As a result, this 
present study must address only the most basic issues. In particular, this study seeks to 
ascertain whether or not the ethics of excellence and effectiveness can shown to exist for 
individual managers, even though the theory itself emphasizes community and- via roles- 
group influences on these individuals. 
3.4. Possible Confounding Issues Based on MacIntyre’s Model 
If MacIntyre has analyzed business ethics correctly, we should be able to find the 
following characteristics: business persons who accept the ethic of effectiveness should define 
themselves in terms of external utility, self, strength, competition. I shall call such persons 
"competitors" (cf. TABLE 1). Business persons who accept the ethic of excellence, on the 
other hand, should define themselves in terms of internal virtues, community, goodness, 
cooperation (hence, "cooperators"). 
Likewise, their ethical referents should differ as well. Competitors should find ethics 
irrelevant or relative. They might adopt a utilitarian framework, but would use this in a biased 
way. Basically, the "market" (read agon) determines ethics. Having no strong ethical 
standards within themselves, they should be amenable to whatever ethical priorities their 
supervisor and peers espouse. Finally, competitors should put self and firm before society. 
Cooperators, on the other hand, should favor formalist or VBE rationales They should 
struggle with social issues even when not encouraged to do so by peers or superiors. 
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But even if MacIntyre is right, a number of confounding factors exist which make 
empirical research difficult. Eight of these are considered here. The first three address ways 
in which MacIntyre’s dichotomy may be too simplistic. The next three look at ways in which 
respondents could unintentionally confound research results. Finally, the last two factors deal 
with ways in which respondents might willfully bias results. 
1. First, even within the VBE paradigm, cooperation!competition is not a simple 
dichotomy. As MacIntyre admits, the two can- and often do- coexist. Someone striving for 
excellence can value competition as a mechanism for developing that excellence. The key 
here is that winning the agon is not an end in itself. As critical as this concept is for VBE, it 
is not that easy to distinguish in a limited empirical study. Such a dualism could lead the 
respondent to choose responses from both poles of the continuum. 
2. The second factor relates to those who accept a utilitarian perspective in the "best" of 
Mill’s formulation. As noted in Chapter 3, such a position will not address excellence as such, 
but will also reject the self-centered orientation (either corporate or personal) of MacIntyre’s 
effectiveness. One such example of this perspective is Milton Friedman [1982] who claims 
that the pursuit of profits is the sole moral imperative of management. Although MacIntyre 
claims that such a position will "degenerate" into egoism eventually, business persons may 
espouse this position with the sincere belief that "effectiveness" is the most ethical position for 
a manager to have. 
3. The third factor deals with the rise of "excellence" as set forth in Peters & Waterman 
[1982] and the Total Quality Management school. Excellence within this context does not 
deal with roles and virtues in an Aristotelian sense. But it does come close. Excellence here 
addresses issues of quality, customer-orientation, and adherence to core values. As such, the 
current emphasis on excellence exists within the middle ground between MacIntyre s poles. 
47 
These first three issues can confound MacIntyre’s taxonomy itself. The remaining issues 
may contribute to respondents’ inability or unwillingness to respond openly to an empirical 
study on MacIntyre’s dichotomy. 
4. The fourth confounding factor relates to Schein’s work on basic assumptions [1985]. If 
assumptions about "the nature of human nature" and "the nature of human relationships" 
[1985: 86] are unconscious, then business persons may act from beliefs of which they are not 
aware. Walsh [1988] is but one reference on selective perception. Responses to an ethical 
scenario may reflect a conscious rationalization which does not reflect the underlying 
(unconscious) assumptions and corresponding misperceptions. 
5. A fifth factor exists in the ethical illiteracy issue. MacIntyre asserts that the very 
language of VBE has been lost. Coupled with the moral muteness of managers [cf. Bird & 
Waters, 1989] there may be managers who implicitly accept a VBE paradigm yet have 
difficulty in explicitly presenting their views. 
6. A sixth factor relates to the phenomenon of identification. Although this problem is 
endemic to all research in business ethics, it poses a special problem for VBE theory. VBE 
states that the individual should identify with the community as a precondition for ethical 
excellence. But such identification can be a purely psychological phenomenon. Competitors 
might well report an other- orientation based on such psychological identification without any 
ethical implications. But just as the term "norm" has both psychological and philosophical 
meanings [e.g. Waterman, 1988], so identification can be either psychological, philosophical, 
or both. Any research based on VBE should attempt to discriminate between these types of 
identification. 
The final two factors might exist within MacIntyre’s taxonomy. These are two possible 
reasons why respondents might knowingly bias their responses. 
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7. The seventh confounding factor relates to the public outcry against unethical behavior 
in business. In the current social atmosphere, business ethics is a popular topic. Chapter 1 
included only samples of such concerns. In the popular literature, claims of abuse and cries 
for punishment are even more pronounced. The prosecution of Milken, Boesky, S&L 
executives, and others further reinforces this social condemnation of unethical behavior. 
Competitors might well see a need to camouflage their true beliefs. This goes beyond simple 
social desirability bias. A true competitor does not believe that such ethical claims are valid at 
all, yet still may play the "ethics game" as a cynical means to manipulate the system. 
8. The eighth and final factor relates to such gamesmanship as it might be manifested in a 
more extreme version. If competitors truly put themselves first, then external norms against 
lying carry no intrinsic weight. When approached by a researcher, a competitor might look at 
such research as yet another game to "win." Manipulating answers to look "good" might be an 
end in itself. Such an attitude would yield the same results as SD bias, yet ironically confirm 
the "competitor" model in one of its most cynical manifestations. The subject would lie to the 
researcher in order to win the research agon. Legitimate SD bias comes from subjects who 
respond positively because they believe that moral behavior is right even though they may not 
actually practice these beliefs in their managerial roles. Cynical competitors might give the 
same "right" answers not because they believe in them, but only because those are the answers 
which will "con" the researcher! Such manipulation of the researcher would support the 
existence of a competitor’s ethic, yet be indistinguishable from the responses of a truly moral 
subject. Unfortunately, in either case the result would be a simple attenuation of the research 
results. Zerbe [1987] notes that social desirability bias can result from either self-deception or 
from impression management. MacIntyre’s theory suggests a cynical twist to the latter. 
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3.5. Hypothesis and Research Question 
The VBE paradigm suggests a fundamental dichotomy in the orientation of organizational 
participants. Those who adopt an internal orientation focusing on excellence will strive to 
meet internal standards and perceive issues in normative terms. They will maintain an internal 
standard by which they evaluate demands, an internal standard linked to their dual roles as 
managers and citizens. Those who adopt an external orientation focusing on effectiveness will 
strive to win, regardless of the implicit moral contradictions. Their morality will remain con¬ 
tingent upon external conditions related to concepts of effectiveness as set forth in TABLE 1. 
If MacIntyre’s excellence/effectiveness dichotomy is correct, we should be able to identify 
managers who fit into these two groups. In order to move from general assertions to an 
empirically verifiable hypothesis, this proposition must be made specific, //managers do 
subscribe to an ethic of excellence or an ethic of effectiveness, then these ethical positions 
should become manifest when managers face a situation which requires that they explain the 
ethic underlying their decisions. Specifically: 
HYPOTHESIS: When confronted with an ethical situation, managers can be grouped into 
those using an ethic of excellence and those using an ethic of effectiveness. 
Empirically validating MacIntyre’s dichotomy is the primary goal of this work. But as it 
is an exploratory study, we have an opportunity to discover associations among demographic 
and attitudinal data which relate to the managers’ ethical perspectives. Therefore, I ask the 
following: 
RESEARCH QUESTION: What demographic and attitudinal factors might be associated 
with managers who are grouped into the ethics of excellence or effectiveness? 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY 
Having developed a theory for business ethics based on the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, 
the next step involves some form of empirical validation. How can we test for the predicted 
excellence/effectiveness dichotomy? The conceptual hypothesis must be converted into a valid 
empirical study. 
Although a methodology chapter typically starts with a discussion of the subjects, that 
format is not followed here. Finding a valid research tool proved to be the most pressing 
issue. Section 4.1 shows how the pre-tests proved vulnerable to several of the research 
concerns set forth in Section 3.3 and 3.4. In this iterative process, Q methodology emerged as 
the research technique best suited for this exploratory work on MacIntyre’s excellence/ 
effectiveness dichotomy. Section 4.2 presents the final scenario which was developed and 
discusses the actual study design which was used. This "chronological" organization of 
Chapter 4 seems the most logical presentation of all the relevant information. Once this has 
been accomplished, the study sample and issues related to the study administration are 
presented in Section 4.3. Chapter 4 concludes with a theoretical defense of Q methodology in 
Section 4.4 as this sets the stage for the explanation of the Results in Chapter 5. 
4.1. Pretests: Problems & Methodological Issues 
Developing a valid way to test the hypothesis stated in Section 3.5 proved more 
challenging than first anticipated. The choice of methodology changed as pre-testing revealed 
some of the problems discussed in the preceding Sections. 
As noted in Section 3.3, this study centers on the ethical systems reported by individual 
managers. It addresses the most basic claim of MacIntyre’s theory: that the two ethical 
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systems of excellence and effectiveness do exist. Given the significance and general 
recognition of the Fritzsche & Becker work, an initial attempt was made to use their vignettes 
and a series of seven point Likert scales to see if individual managers did explain their 
decisions in terms of these two ethics. Using Fritzsche & Becker offered the advantages of 
working from extant research while extending it to include a theory which they did not use. 
In the pre-testing, however, I discovered that the vignettes were biased (towards Anglo males) 
and ambiguous. While the former problem was easily corrected, the latter posed significant 
problems. Respondents reported a sense of confusion and frustration over the terms in the 
vignettes: they reported that they would reverse their answers if the same terms were 
interpreted in different ways. 
As for the Likert scales, the respondents were to rate themselves as managers first: given 
an ethical problem, what would they do? Then they were to go back and rate what other 
managers should do in the same situation. These scales (which were supposed to measure 
subjects’ managerial preferences for ethical approaches to dealing with the vignette problems) 
proved to have insufficient discrimination and were too susceptible to SD bias. Finally, these 
scales could not discriminate between the subjects’ managerial responses and their personal 
priorities. (For example, one manager rated herself roughly in the middle of the scales, then 
rated "other managers" as all l’s and 7’s. When asked why, she reported: "Oh, I want them to 
be perfect...") This person provided an important insight into a design flaw: I had intended the 
Likert scale to reveal different expectations about self-as-manager versus others-as-managers. 
Instead, it opened up an opportunity for people to use a double standard. 
Given these problems, I shifted the choice of methodology to the Q method. Because 
subjects must rank order a number of statements, they are forced to prioritize their own 
understandings, both implicit and explicit. While one might proclaim ethics as valuable, that 
same person might rank it below such competing values as winning or profit when forced 
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to do so. Thus the Q method offers an empirical tool for discerning subjective priorities which 
discriminates among priorities better than a series of Likert scales. 
First, a pair of related scenarios were created. Following Trevino [1992], I varied the 
scenarios to suggest differing organizational cultures. All else was kept constant. Modeled 
after Fritzsche & Becker’s work, these scenarios addressed the need for more realistic 
situations which included significant ethical conflicts. These scenarios concluded with six 
graduated options from which each respondent must choose. These options reflected 
behavioral choices from doing nothing to putting society before self and firm. Once these 
scenarios were read, each respondent performed a Q sort on 60 items reflecting the dichotomy 
set forth in TABLE 1. 
Unfortunately, three new problems arose in connection with this pre-test. First, the ethical 
dilemma proved too "serious." Regardless of the scenario read, only one factor emerged. In 
follow-up interviews, respondents complained that since risk to human life was involved, they 
felt they had to respond in only one way. The scenario could have been re-written, but the 
second problem made that issue moot. 
This second issue related to MacIntyre’s terminology. Although the Q items were 
consistent with MacIntyre’s taxonomy, respondents still found the terms ambiguous. For 
example, "excellence" has a specific meaning for MacIntyre, but respondents could take it to 
mean just the opposite, as when a manager is "excellent" at destroying a competitor. Follow¬ 
up interviews revealed a total lack of consensus on the basic meanings of the Q items. Indeed, 
respondents felt frustrated with the perceived ambiguity of many of the statements. 
The final problem related to complexity/length. Respondents found the scenario too 
complicated and the Q sort too long. Having to "wade through the scenario, then sort 60 
statements, and finally answer a sheet of personal questions proved tiresome. 
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In response to these problems, yet another scenario and Q sort were created. These final 
products answered all of the problems and proved satisfactory for this study. These final 
versions are presented in Section 4.2. 
4.2. Final Study Design 
4.2.1. Study Scenario 
To address the problems identified in the pre-tests, the "final" scenario was re-written to 
provide a simpler situation without any life-or-death implications. This scenario was 
structured to present MacIntyre’s meaning of ternis such as "excellence" and "winning." 
Respondents were encouraged to refer back to the scenario when confused about the meaning 
of a particular Q item. 
Here is the full scenario: 
As you walk into the ABC Company’s division meeting, you sense the 
tension. The VP is sitting at the head of the table with a scowl. You and your six 
fellow managers take your seats. 
The VP begins to speak. "If you’ll look at the report in front of you, you’ll 
see that we have trouble. Our chief competitor, XYZ Coip, has come out with a 
better product than ours. That’s not my estimate, it’s the findings of our own 
R&D group. What’s worse, they’ve got a patent on the key ingredient, so we 
can’t copy their formula. You know that we need at least a 10% profit margin in 
order to meet the President’s goal. This XYZ product can mean real trouble here. 
This afternoon I’ve got to take this R&D report to the President. When I go 
upstairs I want your recommendation for a coping strategy. Do whatever it takes 
to beat this thing." With that, the VP got up and left. 
Along with the R&D report on the XYZ product is a Marketing analysis. 
This analysis notes that XYZ plans to sell this new product at about the same price 
as your ABC equivalent. Obviously, XYZ is going for increased market share at 
your company’s expense. 
You sit quietly and listen to what each of your fellow managers has to say: 
Alice: If XYZ offers a better product at our price, logic says we’re going to 
lose something. Let’s drop our price to maintain our sales volume; we can’t keep 
our 10% profit margin given this new competition. Market competition makes us 
do our best, but in this case, someone did better. We should take the loss for now 
and get R&D to come up with a product which matches or beats XYZ’s: then 
we’ll earn our way to the top. The VP may not like our recommendation, but 
he’ll want the truth from us. 
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Ed: I read this situation differently. We’re a business not a social service 
agency. It’s our job to give the boss what he wants. After all, as long as my boss 
tells me to do it, it’s okay. We must do whatever we can to maintain our profit 
margin. We should use our marketing skills to put XYZ in a bad light, even if 
they really have a better product. 
Vince: Using our marketing power is one thing, but using it to lie is another. 
You see the report: their product is definitely better. Let’s play this one straight: 
tell the public the truth. If we misrepresent these products, we manipulate the 
public which depends upon us for much of its information. Our customers trust 
us: and keeping that trust is good business. Even if we lose profits on this 
product, honesty benefits our company in the long run. We can’t let a short-term 
"fix" blind us to the long-term risks. Working to be an "excellent" company may 
mean short-term losses, but we’ll be better off overall. For me, it’s a question of 
professional integrity: I want to be a good manager in a good company. Being a 
good manager involves doing what’s right for my company and my society. 
Sara: I disagree. We live in a dog-eat-dog world. Excellence is not "inside" 
us: excellence is winning in the market. Trust the market: if people buy our 
product, we win. If not, XYZ wins. A good company beats the competition. A 
good manager maximizes profit. A good manager gives the boss what he wants- 
and our boss wants that 10% return. This isn’t about customers, it’s about out¬ 
running the XYZ Corp. People will believe our ads. They buy, they’re happy 
with what they get, no one is hurt. I’m not worried about character. As a 
manager, only actions count. 
Paul: We have a good product, even if it’s no longer the best. The 
aggressive ad campaign involves a moral compromise I’m reluctant to make. I 
like working here because I make a good product, benefit society, and feel good 
about myself as a person. I’m not sure your approach matches my view of a good 
manager. We have a responsibility to society which goes beyond making a profit 
for our owners. The "trust" issue is not just a matter of good business, it’s a 
matter of good ethics. As managers, it our personal responsibility to do the right 
thing even if it costs some money in the short run. If I want to be an excellent 
manager, then I have to live up to the ideals within myself. I want to do my 
personal best in all areas of my life. I learned that "honesty is the best policy" 
when I was just a child, and that still holds for me as a manager. Doing the right 
thing sometimes requires moral courage. We managers are moral agents who have 
to use our judgment to balance the needs of society and the company. 
John: Paternalism is bad for society: we should not decide what is 'best for 
the public. We benefit society by making as much profit as we can: nothing more. 
In America, the market decides what is moral, not managers like us. We are 
"moral" when we compete as hard as we can and let the market take care of the 
rest Managers shouldn’t use terms like "good & bad." We need terms like 
"strong & weak," "winners & losers." And consider this issue another way: our 
duty is to our boss and to ourselves. We need to worry about our own careers as 
much as the company or society. I’m not risking my job for some abstract moral 
principle. Ethics is fine in books, but in the real world you do what you have to 
do. In a competitive market, you can’t let "ethics' hurt you or your company. 
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At this point, it becomes obvious that you hold the swing vote. Which way do 
you go? 
Vote to recommend an aggressive marketing campaign attacking XYZ’s product. 
Vote to recommend lowering the price on your product. 
This final version of the scenario uses this discussion among six managers to present the 
various concepts of "excellence" and "effectiveness" as used by MacIntyre. The subsequent Q 
items are built from these statements of the Scenario "conversation" (see Appendix B). In this 
way, respondents are given some help in understanding the usage of particular terms such as 
"excellence" and "effectiveness." 
Follow-up interviews with the actual respondents of this study indicated that this approach 
reduced the ambiguity concerning the meaning of individual statements. As Brown [1980] 
notes that the key issue in a Q sort is the respondents’ subjective preferences about various 
statements, using the scenario to "define" those statements in the first place is conceptually 
appropriate. 
4.2.2. Q Sort and Supplemental Data 
The scenario ends with a 3/3 tie, and the statement that the reader of the scenario 
(hereafter: respondent) must cast the deciding vote. Once this is done, the respondents move 
on to the Q sort. In introducing the Q sort, the instructions (see Appendix A.3) note that the 
respondents should evaluate each statement according to his/her beliefs. It is expected that the 
resulting Q sort will involve a mixing of ideas. The actual Q items reflect statements made by 
each of the six managers in the Scenario. (The managers are cited on each card, so the 
respondents can refer back to the Scenario.) In this manner, particular connotations for each 
term become evident. 
The Q sort itself was reduced to 48 items. Again, the pre-test indicated that this was more 
manageable by the respondents. Brown [1986: 59] states that Q sorts typically range in 
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number from 40 to 60." As the number of theoretical variables is six, this allows for a 
reasonable number of Q items for each variable. The comments of each manager in the 
Scenario are made into individual statements which comprise the Q items actually used. 
Each Q item was placed on a separate card. While the statement and speaker were 
included on a card, the statement code (as shown in TABLE 5 and Appendix B) was not. 
Rather, a random number was assigned to each Q item. Each respondent received a pack of 
48 cards. This pack was shuffled (randomized) before distribution to avoid any bias due to the 
order in which the Q items were considered. The purpose of identifying speakers was to 
provide a contextual definition for terms, not to bias respondents. As can be seen in TABLES 
5-10, this goal was achieved. None of the respondents selected all of the statements of one 
speaker as those with which s/he most agreed or disagreed. That is, each respondent created a 
personal set of priorities which was different from any of the managerial positions set forth in 
the scenario. 
TABLE 3 presents at theoretical distribution of the Q items which came from the 
managerial scenario. The number in parentheses after each manager indicates the number of 
statements. The codes below each manager are the "shorthand" used to report on the Q items 
which reflect the manager’s position. (Thus XI means "Excellence, Level 1" and F2 means 
"Effectiveness, Level 2." I use these codes extensively in Chapter 5.) The managers’ 
theoretical positions were constructed to "pair off' as follows: 
At Level 1, managers take implicit positions favoring excellence or effectiveness as these 
have been set forth in this paper. Alice favors a strategy which will result in a better product 
while Ed recommends a strategy which focuses on winning. But neither uses moral terms. 
Rather, they express their positions in conventional business terms. At Level 2, Vince & Sara 
use the terms of excellence and effectiveness, justifying such positions as being good for 
business." This represents an intermediate step in which the ethical positions are not end 
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TABLE 3 
Theoretical Distribution of Q Items 
EXCELLENCE EFFECTIVENESS 
Level 1: morally mute, but leaning 
towards this position: Alice (5) Ed (5) 
(XI) (FI) 
Level 2: excellence v. effectiveness only 
as "good business" Vince (9) Sara (9) 
(X2) (F2) 
Level 3: excellence v. effectiveness 
as moral issues Paul (10) John (10) 
(*3) (F3) 
Total Number of Q items for each category: (24) (24) 
values in themselves, but instrumental values to promote the Company either in the "long-run” 
(Vince) or "short-run" (Sara). The last two speakers make the clearest claims for excellence or 
effectiveness as the "moral" priorities for managers. 
Respondents were asked initially to sort the Q items into categories based on whether they 
agreed or disagreed with the statements. Then they were to sort the items again into 11 
categories using a form (see Appendix A.4) which distributed their rankings to approximate a 
normal distribution: 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
2 3 3 5 
r- 
oo 
r-~ 5 3 3 2 
The lower number indicates the number of statements which could be placed in each category. 
Once they completed the Q sorts, respondents filled out "Supplemental Data Sheets. This 
was used to gather the following information: 
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* Age 
* Years with present company, 
* Years of managerial experience, 
* Managerial level, 
* Competitiveness of business environment, 
* Manager’s perceived loyalty to company, 
* Company’s perceived loyalty to manager, 
* Does company have a code of ethics?, 
* If yes, does company live this code?, 
* Manager’s belief that other managers would choose same strategy, and 
* Manager’s reaction to an order to reverse this decision. 
Some of this data are demographic (e.g. age, sex, years of managerial experience). Some of 
the data are attitudinal (e.g. perceived competitiveness of business environment, manager’s 
belief that other managers would choose the same strategy). In determining the data to be 
collected on this sheet, the idea was to elicit information which had an a priori relationship 
with the anticipated P-sets. Given the expectation that managers would group on the 
hypothesized excellence/effectiveness dichotomy, I looked for personal data which might 
reveal significant patterns among the respondents in each of these two categories. These data 
are presented and analyzed in Section 5.3. 
Appendix A.5 contains a sample of this "Supplemental Data Sheet." In addition to the 
data collected directly from these sheets, two additional pieces of information were collected: 
* Respondent’s Class, (see Section 4.3) and 
* Business Option Chosen. 
As the study packets were pre-coded with class and a random number, it was possible to 
ascertain whether the respondent was a member of the Marketing class or one of the 
Organizational Behavior classes sampled. As for the second item, this was the choice each 
manager reported for lowering price or going with the aggressive ad campaign. 
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4.3. Study Sample 
The scenario used in this study is geared towards middle managers. Since Q methodology 
depends upon the number of Q items for factor analysis rather than the number of respondents, 
the number of subjects (respondents) employed in this study is not critical. Nevertheless, a 
sample of 25 was desired. Practicing managers who were currently taking MBA courses were 
selected from three New England schools. As this study deals with the ethical priorities of 
individual managers, the specific MBA course being taken was not of paramount importance. 
The first group of respondents came from a Marketing course. As additional respondents were 
desired, a number of professors teaching evening MBA courses were contacted. The 
remaining respondents came from OB courses. Having this Marketing/OB dichotomy 
suggested another datum which was then incorporated into the study: respondent’s class. 
A total of 32 responses were received; seven of these were unusable either because of 
incomplete data or failure to meet the relevant criteria (e.g. one respondent was not a 
practicing manager). This left the number of usable responses at 25. 
Within the sample, 16 were taking an evening MBA Marketing Course while the other 9 
were in different MBA Organizational Behavior courses. There were 11 men and 14 women, 
of whom 16 were 34 years old or younger with the other 9 being 35 or older. TABLE 11 in 
Section 5.3 presents all of the supplemental data gathered. 
The respondents were sampled in the second half of the term. The study was presented as 
a "Study of Managerial Priorities" in an attempt to establish a value-neutral context and avoid 
social desirability bias. 
The first 16 responses were collected at one time from an MBA Marketing course. The 
professor gave an hour of class time at the end of one class period. Coming in with 20 copies 
of the study and 20 sets of cards for the Q-sort, I was able to complete 17 Q sorts in only one 
hour. During that time, I was available to answer any questions concerning the study. As the 
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study materials included a written set of instructions, there were only minor questions. Of 
these 17 responses, only one was unusable, and that was because the respondent failed to meet 
the criterion that each respondent be a practicing manager. 
Additional respondents were sought from MBA classes on Organizational Behavior. 
(Business & Society courses were avoided for fear that respondents would succumb to social 
desirability bias.) Professors from three classes distributed the study in self-addressed 
envelopes. These professors explained that the students were completing the study on a 
voluntary basis at home. Of the 60 packets distributed in these three classes, 15 were returned 
over a period of four weeks. This is a response rate of 25%. Of these 15, six were unusable 
for a variety of reasons, including three which were returned uncompleted. The other nine 
were acceptable and brought the sample total up to the desired target of 25. 
4.4. Use of Q Methodology and Factor Analysis 
Although it has not received attention within the realm of business ethics, Q methodology 
fits well in an exploratory study and can be used to explore theoretical structures [McKeown 
& Thomas, 1988]. Q methodology focuses on the subjects’ perceptions, their "shared 
subjectivity with others on [a] factor" [McKeown & Thomas, 1988:17]. As Brown puts it: 
What Q methodology deals with... are states of mind.... Whereas contemporary 
social science searches for reductionistic determinants, the factors of Q 
methodology are indeterminate: We [sic] can never predict the factors of Q 
methodology with certainty, particularly at the level of the single case, exactly how 
many factors will emerge, nor what their form and structure will be. [1986: 73] 
The concept of a factor plays a central role in Q methodology. Subjects (respondents) 
receive the Q sample (the set of statements created by the researcher) and indicate the degree 
to which they agree or disagree with particular items. The resulting Q sorts are then 
mathematically evaluated for commonalities which are called factors. A factor represents an 
"attitudinal grouping implicit in the correlation matrix" [Brown, 1986: 59-60]. The emergent 
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factors are not predetermined by the researcher. Rather, they emerge from the commonalities 
of various respondents. Analyzing factors for their significance goes in two directions, as can 
be shown symbolically: 
subjects —» FACTOR Q items 
The subjects who share a common subjective (attitudinal) position towards the Q sample 
will load highly on that shared factor. The researcher thus finds a group of people with a 
shared opinion. This group of people (a P-set) can be studied to see what demographic or 
other commonalities exist among them. 
But the underlying reason for this group’s existence is the factor. As this factor represents 
a shared subjectivity among the respondents, this shared subjectivity can be explored directly. 
This second "exploration" can be done by examining the particular pattern of the subjects’ Q 
sorts. By looking at the pattern of weights assigned to particular Q items (e.g. -4 for one 
item, +5 for another) the researcher may be able to identify and defend a particular explanation 
for the subjects’ subjective position on the issue being studied. 
In Q method, variables are the people performing the Q sorts, not Q sample 
statements. Persons significantly associated with a given factor, therefore, are 
assumed to share a common perspective.... An individual’s positive loading on a 
factor indicates his or her shared subjectivity with others on that factor, negative 
loadings, on the other hand, are signs of rejection of the factor’s perspective.... 
...Factors can be interpreted by referring to demographic correlates of the 
respondents and, more importantly, to the factor scores for each factor. Factor 
scores are essentially weighted z-scores for each statement in the Q sample.... by 
examining the factor scores for selected items we can discern the basic themes 
distinguishing the [various] perspectives.... [McKeown & Thomas, 1988: 17-18] 
Factor analysis (or the version used in SPSS/PC+: Principal Components Analysis) uses 
the Q sort responses to look for common patterns among the respondents. When a number of 
respondents have similar responses (e.g. they agree and disagree to the same items) then these 
respondents are grouped together. This grouping is the factor.” The factor represents the 
shared commonality among the responses. It is a "least squares fit," an ideal very similar to a 
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regression line in R methodology.1 In the present study, the emergent factors were examined 
to see what respondent and Q item patterns could be discerned for each factor. In particular, 
the Q item patterns were studied to see whether or not they supported MacIntyre’s claims. 
Since the emergent factor is an "ideal," each respondent grouped on that factor will 
approximate that ideal more or less closely than others. How closely each respondent comes 
is reflected in a factor score. For each factor, these scores are shown in bold in Appendix 
C.2. This Appendix identifies which respondents are grouped on which factors. 
Once the respondents have been grouped by factor, a "weighted factor score" can be 
calculated for each Q item [see Brown, 1980: 240-243]. This weighted factor score represents 
the "ideal" respondent’s valuation of each Q item. To calculate this average, the Factor Score 
Coefficient Matrix is used (see Appendix C.3 for these values). The Coefficient weight for 
each respondent grouped in this factor is multiplied by his/her rating of each Q item. These 
weighted values for each respondent are then summed to produce a weighted average for that 
item for each factor. An example of this weighting process is shown in Appendix C.3. 
TABLE 5 (in Section 5.1) shows the result of this weighting process. 
Once the factors emerged in the Q sort, x2 tests were run using these factors and the 
supplemental data to identify significant associations. As this is an exploratory study rather 
than a confirmatory one, relations with p < .10 are included to show not only statistically 
significant relationships but alto to suggest areas worthy of further consideration. These 
explorations of the supplemental data suggest answers to the research question set forth at the 
end of Chapter 3. 
1. Indeed, the mathematical manipulations used in both Q methodology and R methodology are 
the same. The data have been "reversed." 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS 
Once the study was administered, the data were analyzed in two ways. The first of these 
was to use factor analysis according to the Q method in order to determine what factors would 
emerge from the respondents’ Q sorts. Section 5.1 reviews this process and shows the four 
emergent factors. These factors reflect the shared subjective priorities of the respondents who 
clustered on each factor (P-sets). In order to interpret what these priorities were, each factor 
was interpreted using the Q items which received the greatest agreement/disagreement among 
the respondents. This interpretation occurs in Section 5.2. 
The second major analysis of the data used the supplemental data which each respondent 
provided. As Q methodology concentrates on the respondents themselves, variables which 
differentiate among the P-sets are of great interest. Section 5.3 uses Chi-square tests to 
identify significant relationships among this supplemental data and the emergent factors. 
Possible reasons for these relationships are then presented. 
5.1. Factor Analysis 
The 25 Q sorts were factor analyzed using SPSS/PC+. Using a varimax rotation [Brown, 
1980: 31-33] four factors emerged with eigenvalues greater than 1, accounting for 68.3% of 
the total variance. TABLE 4 shows the significant results of the Principal Components 
Analysis run on the data set. These four factors (R1 - R4 in TABLE 4; hereafter, Factor 1 - 
Factor 4) are analyzed in this chapter. The full version of this table, which accounts for 100% 
of the variance, appears in Appendix C.l. 
As indicated in TABLE 4, Factor 1 accounts for nearly half of the variance among the 
respondents. Eighteen of the 25 respondents loaded on this factor. Clearly, Factor 1 
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TABLE 4 
Principal Components Analysis 
Variable Communality ★ 
★ 
Factor 
R1 1.00000 ★ 1 
R2 1.00000 ★ 2 
R3 1.00000 ★ 3 
R4 1.00000 ★ 4 
R5 1.00000 ★ 5 
Eigenvalue Pet of Var Cum Pet 
12.15677 48.6 48.6 
2.26936 9.1 57.7 
1.43061 5.7 63.4 
1.21610 4.9 68.3 
.91688 3.7 72.0 
(see Appendix C.l for full table) 
represents a dominant set of priorities among the respondents. Factor 2 had 3 respondents 
while Factors 3 and 4 each had 2 respondents. Section 4.4 contained the discussion of how 
weighted factor scores can be computed for each Q item by factor. TABLE 5 presents the 
actual results. 
The KEY in TABLE 5 merits some comment as these codes are used throughout the rest 
of this Chapter. Each Q item is identified in a three part code. The X and F categories repre¬ 
sent MacIntyre’s basic dichotomy of Excellence and Effectiveness. The 1 - 3 represent the 
levels of usage described in TABLE 3 and Section 4.2.2. The a - h merely refer to the 
different statements within each category and have no other significance. In TABLES 6 - 10, 
both the codes and the Q statements are given. Appendix B lists all of the Q statements with 
their codes. 
The actual factor scores within the body of TABLE 5 were derived according to the 
procedures set forth in Section 4.4 and illustrated in Appendix C.3. The bold values and those 
marked with an asterisk sign indicate values of particular interest. The bold values are those 
which indicate relatively strong agreement or disagreement. These values give the clearest 
indications of the respondents’ subjective priorities. For example, the two respondents in 
Factor 3 strongly disagreed (—5) with statement Xlb: 'Let’s drop our price to maintain our 
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TABLE 5 
Weighted Factor Scores For Each Q Item 
KEY: CODE is Q-item reference from TABLE 3. 
F = Effectiveness 1 = Morally mute a - h = specific items within each 
X = Excellence 2 = X/F as good business category 
3 = X/F as moral issues 
Bold values indicate items included in TABLES 6 - 9 
* indicates item weight significantly different from weights for other factors 
Underlined items are included in TABLE 10 
CODE Fctrl Fctr2 Fctr3 Fctr4 | CODE Fctrl Fctr2 Fctr3 Fctr4 
XI a 1 3 0 1 | Fla 0 0 1 3 
XI b 1 0 -5* 0 | Fib -1 -2 2 0 
XI c 1 4 -3* 2 | Flc -4 -4 1* -4 
XI d 2* -3 -2 -2 | Fid -2 0 4 -2 
XI e 1 -2 -1 0 | Fie -4 -2 -1 -3 
X2a 2 2 -2 1 | F2a 0 2 3 0 
X2b 0 -2 -4 0 | F2b -1 3 0 2 
X2c 2 2 -2 -4 | F2c -2 0 0 1 
X2d 3 1 4 -1 | F2d -1 4 1 0 
X2e 2 0 0 2 | F2e 0 1 4 3 
X2f 2 0 -2 1 | F2f -1 0 1 0 
X2g 1 0 0 4 1 F2g -2 -4 4 1 
X2h 2 3 1 0 | F2h -2 -1 2 -4 
X2i 2 0 1 0 1 F2i -3 -4 -2 -2 
X3a 1 0 -3 -3 | F3a 0 1 -3 -1 
X3b 3 -1 -1 1 | F3b -3 -3 -2 0 
X3c 2 -2 3 0 | F3c -2 2 1 2 
X3d 2 0 -1 0 | F3d -1 -1 1 4 
X3e 1 0 1 2 | F3e -1 -1 0 -1 
X3f 3 1 1 2 | F3f -1 -1 0 -1 
X3g 2 1 4 2 1 F3g 0 4 1 1 
X3h 1 0 -1 0 | F3h -1 1 -2 -2 
X3i 3 2 2 3 | F3i -3 1 -2 -4 
X3 j 1 -1 -1 -2 1 £3j -3 -4 -2 -2 
sales volume; we can’t keep our 10% profit margin given this new competition. (Alice) 
Since these respondents could pick only 2 Q items for this "Strongly Disagree category, this 
statement reveals their strongest subjective priority. These bold values are listed for the factors 
in TABLES 6 - 9 to provide the basis for interpreting these factors. Those Q items which 
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received roughly equal ratings across all four factors are underlined in TABLE 5 and are 
presented and discussed in Section 5.2.5 as Cross-Factor items. 
Besides noting values that are extreme in their own right, another piece of information is 
provided by values which differ significantly from the values assigned by respondents of other 
factors. The asterisk for Flc, Factor 3, provides an example. While a value of +1 is not 
particularly significant in itself, this value does take on added import when compared to the 
values assigned by the respondents of the other factors. While respondents of Factors 1, 2, 
and 4 strongly disagreed with this statement, the respondents of Factor 3 were neutral (or even 
slightly agreeable). We can learn something of the priorities of Factor 3 respondents by 
analyzing them in contrast to the others. (This is done in Section 5.2.3.) One way of noting 
such a difference among values is to list them side by side. This is done in the text as 
follows: Flc (-4 / -4 / +1 / -4). The values are the weighted factor scores for Factors 1 - 4, 
respectively. When such a list is used to compare one factor with the other 3, the value for 
that particular factor will be highlighted as shown here. 
While some values differed notably from the others for a given item, four items showed a 
remarkable uniformity among the four factors. These are marked by underlining the Q item. 
These items are discussed in Section 5.2.5 as "cross-factor" items. 
5.2. Factor Interpretation 
Interpretation of the four factors supports MacIntyre’s thesis of an excellence/efficiency 
dichotomy. Further, analysis of the supplemental data revealed several significant relationships 
as indicated by the Chi-square analyses. Each of these results is considered in turn. 
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5.2.1. Factor 1: The Excellent Manager 
The first of the factors accounted for 18 of the 25 respondents and almost half (48.6%) of 
the total variance. An analysis of the Q items most highly rated in this factor (see TABLE 6) 
TABLE 6 
Factor 1: The "Excellent" Manager 
Wghtd Stmt 
Ave Code 
+3 X2d 
+3 X3b 
+3 X3f 
+3 X3i 
-4 Flc 
-4 Fie 
-3 F2\ 
-3 F3b 
-3 F3i 
-3 F3j 
Note: all XV\ 
Statement 
Our customers trust us: and keeping that trust is good business. (Vince) 
I like working here because I make a good product, benefit society, and feel 
good about myself as a person. (Paul) 
If I want to be an excellent manager, then I have to live up to the ideals within 
myself. (Paul) 
Doing the right thing sometimes requires courage. (Paul) 
After all, as long as my boss tells me to do it, it’s okay. (Ed) 
We should use our marketing skills to put XYZ in a bad light, even if they 
really have a better product. (Ed) 
I’m not worried about character. As a manager, only actions count (Sara) 
We benefit society by making as much profit as we can: nothing more. (John) 
Ethics is fine in books, but in the real world you do what you have to 
do. (John) 
In a competitive market, you can’t let "ethics" hurt you or your 
company. (John) 
3’s ranked fairly high, F3’s ranked fairly low. 
strongly supports MacIntyre’s concept of excellence in the items with which this P-set both 
agreed and disagreed most strongly. The common theme running throughout these statements 
is the significance of personal excellence even when functioning as a manager. Note 
concurrence with X3f (+3) on the centrality of inner ideals and the disagreement with F2\ on 
the idea that character does not count. 
In analyzing a given factor, one does well to keep in mind Brown s admonition concerning 
Q sorts: 
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In the final analysis, there is less interest in what individual statements mean 
theoretically than in what the subject does with them operationally, and it is the Q 
sort which gives substance to this operation. Basically, the Q sort enables the 
subject to provide a model of his point of view. Since Q statements typically 
contain opinions rather than facts, the construction of one’s own statement 
arrangement, like the mixing of a tobacco blend, is strictly a mater of personal 
taste... [1980: 55] 
Even with Brown’s warning, the consistency of Q statements in Factor 1 admits to a 
straightforward interpretation. The strongest Q items are "neatly" split between statements 
about excellence (agree) and effectiveness (disagree). As noted in TABLE 6, this dichotomy 
extended beyond the extreme weights to most of the items in the Q sort. 
The idea of describing three levels of ethical commitment, however, did not receive any 
clear support in this factor or any of the other factors. Looking at those factors given in 
TABLE 6, X2d (+3)1 can be interpreted as strong support for the integrity of the managerial 
role. Grouped as it is with the strongly moral claims of the X3's, it suggests that the respon¬ 
dents read this statement as a significant credo for the excellent manager. The F items on the 
negative side also reflect a strong disinclination to excuse unethical behavior. They explicitly 
reject such notions as "following orders" (Flc; -4) and maximizing profit (F3b; -3). The 
rejection of F3i (-3) and F3j (-3) reinforces the emphasis on their perception that ethics does 
play a significant role for managers. 
Having made a case for interpreting Factor 1 as "Excellence," I wish to comment on the 
relatively "modest" weights given the Q items listed in TABLE 6. As 18 respondents loaded 
on this factor, it is not surprising that all of them did not agree on a particular item for a +5 or 
-5. The weighting process described in Section 4.4 naturally results in lower averages for the 
factor with the highest number of respondents due to central tendency. Even in the remaining 
three factors, only one -5 exists, and that comes in Factor 3, which has only two respondents. 
1. To assist the reader with the interpretations of Factors 1 - 4 in the following sections, the 
weighted factor score for the P-set being discussed is included. 
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One additional statement deserves attention in analyzing the respondents of Factor 1. Xld 
(+2 / -3 / -2 / -2) shows a significantly1 higher ranking among Factor 1 respondents than 
among any of the other groups. This item reads: "We should take the loss for now and get 
R&D to come up with a product which matches or beats XYZ’s: then we’ll earn our way to 
the top. (Alice)" This statement suggests that Factor 1 respondents are willing to sacrifice 
some profit in order to follow their moral principles. The other respondents were notably 
unwilling to agree with this idea. 
Seventy two percent of the respondents loaded on this factor, so almost three fourths of the 
managers studied express a preference for excellence over effectiveness. This high percentage 
suggests that times may have changed since MacIntyre wrote After Virtue. His contention that 
effectiveness is a dominant business ethic is not supported. 
This shift towards business excellence raises some questions for future consideration. One 
possibility might be that MacIntyre was mistaken in his view of business. Another might be 
that one or more of the confounding issues raised in Section 3.4 was at work. Confounding 
issue #3 discussed the rise of the concept of "excellence" through popular books such as Peters 
& Waterman’s In Search of Excellence and through the TQM movement. The present study 
cannot distinguish between their uses of the term "excellence" and those of MacIntyre (and the 
Scenario). These differences may be minimal in themselves. While it is necessary to note the 
possibility of confounding here, the positive statements shown in TABLE 6 cover a wide range 
of ideas reflective of MacIntyre’s concept of excellence. Thus this study offers empirical 
support for MacIntyre’s concept of excellence. 
Other possible confounding issues raised in Section 3.4 were issue #7 in which some 
competitors tried to respond as cooperators to "look good" and issue #8 in which competitors 
1. Any item ranked 4 or more units higher or lower than its ranking in the other factors [Brown, 
1980]. 
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made it a game to respond like cooperators. These latter two possibilities, along with the 
general issue of social desirability bias (Section 3.3) cannot be dismissed. These mitigating 
effects are extremely difficult to ferret out, in part because they may be unnoticed by the 
respondents themselves. The forced choices of a Q sort, however, do challenge respondents to 
examine their priorities consciously. Further, the limited number of choices allotted to 
strongly held positions (2 choices for +5 and 2 for -5) makes those choices more likely to 
reflect the conscious beliefs of the respondents. Further, as the study was run anonymously, 
only consciously manipulative respondents would try to distort the results. Most respondents 
have a chance to state their positions without fear of repercussions against a socially 
undesirable position. For these reasons, I believe Factor 1 (and Factors 2 - 4) accurately 
reflect the shared subjective priorities of the respondents. 
522. Factor 2: The Effective/Winning Manager 
Factors 2-4 can all be viewed as variations of MacIntyre’s concept of the effective 
manager (competitor). But these P-sets differed in which aspect of effectiveness they 
emphasized. TABLE 7 presents the most heavily weighted Q items for the P-set of Factor 2. 
Factor 2 supports MacIntyre’s concept of the effective manager. Note the twin standards: 
corporate competition (F2d; +4) and personal success (F3g; +4). For these respondents, 
effectiveness finds its primary expression in the concept of winning. Statements F2b (+3) 
and Xlc (+4) provide explicit support for this emphasis on winning: competition in the 
marketplace (the agon) determines the winners. (The reader may note one of the significant 
strengths of Q methodology here. Regardless of the designer’s intent-- e.g. that X\c is 
"supposed" to be a morally mute statement supporting the ethic of excellence— it is the context 
created by the P-set which determines the interpretation of this item here.) 
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TABLE 7 
Factor 2: The "Effective/Winning" Manager 
Wghtd Stmt 
Ave Code Statement 
+4 
+4 
+4 
+3 
+3 
F2d A good company beats the competition. (Sara) 
F3g We need to worry about our own careers as much as the company or 
society. (John) 
XI c Market competition makes us do our best, but in this case, someone did 
better. (Alice) 
FIb Trust the market: if people buy our product, we win. If not, XYZ wins. (Sara) 
X2h For me, it’s a question of professional integrity: I want to be a good manager 
in a good company. (Vince) 
-4 
-4 
-4 
-4 
-3 
-3 
Flc After all, as long as my boss tells me to do it, it’s okay. (Ed) 
F2g This isn’t about customers, it’s about out-running the XYZ Corp. (Sara) 
F2i I’m not worried about character. As a manager, only actions count. (Sara) 
F3j In a competitive market, you can’t let "ethics" hurt you or your 
company. (John) 
F3b We benefit society by making as much profit as we can: nothing more. (John) 
XId We should take the loss for now and get R&D to come up with a product 
which matches or beats XYZ’s: then we’ll earn our way to the top. (Alice) 
The two "excellent" items included as agree items take on a different twist when grouped 
with the others. XIc appears as another defense of the competitive system, a grudging 
admission of defeat. X2h (+3) appears somewhat ambiguous in this context. Here "good" 
appears to mean successful. As MacIntyre notes, this term remains significant in both VBE 
and emotivist terminology, but the determinant of what is good shifts from internally 
determined to externally determined. Within the ethic of effectiveness, a good manager in a 
good company should be a winning manager in a winning company. Looking back to the 
Factor 2 column in TABLE 5, we can see that the remainder of the X2 statements received 
only lukewarm agreement at best. Thus this particular statement was interpreted as distinct 
from the rest of Alice’s statements. 
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This limited interpretation of X2h is reinforced by a pragmatic orientation which can be 
seen in the items with which the Factor 2 P-set disagreed. Xld (-3) indicates an unwillingness 
to take a financial loss. Although not rated strongly enough to be included in TABLE 7, item 
X2b (-2) provides support for this position. X2b states: "Let’s play this one straight: tell the 
public the truth. (Vince)" The fairly strong disagreement with this statement suggests no 
strong moral sense about doing "what’s best" for the public. Rather, Xld and X2b suggest a 
pragmatic orientation characteristic of the effective manager as set forth by MacIntyre. 
The F items with which this P-set disagree pose some interesting possibilities. F3b (-3) 
shows that these respondents do not see profit maximization from a Friedmanesque perspective 
(cf. Factor 3). F2i (-4) and F3j (-4) suggest that some form of ethics does have a role. But 
while these respondents may be reluctant to say that ethics is irrelevant, they do not offer any 
positive affirmation of what that ethic might be. The moral ambivalence of these responses 
may indicate that moral issues are simply not that relevant in their minds. 
5.2J. Factor 3: The Effective/Profit Maximizing Manager 
This third factor, shown in TABLE 8, bears some significant similarities with Factor 2. 
For this P-set, there is the greatest willingness to withhold the truth from the public (X2b; -4). 
But unlike Factor 2, Factor 3 respondents see their primary purpose as maximizing profit, as 
can be seen by their agreement and disagreement with a number of items: Fid (+4), Fit (+4); 
and on the negative side, XI b (-5), XIc (-3). There is an amorality here that ignores the 
customers (F2g; +4) in favor of the agon between their company and XYZ Corp. XIb 
(+1 / 0 / -5 / 0) stands out even more in contrast to the rankings of the other groups. 
Likewise, Xlc (+1 / +4 / -3 / +2) reinforces this primacy of profit 
Again, a "moral" statement bears reinterpretation in light of the other expressed priorities 
of this group. X2d (+4) appears to be a pragmatic concern as opposed to a moral (or 
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TABLE 8 
Factor 3: The "Effective/Profit Maximizing" Manager 
Wghtd Stmt 
Ave Code Statement 
+4 
+4 
+4 
+4 
+4 
+3 
+3 
Fid We must do whatever we can to maintain our profit margin. (Ed) 
Fit A good manager maximizes profit. (Sara) 
Fig This isn’t about customers, it’s about out-running the XYZ Corp. (Sara) 
Xld Our customers trust us: and keeping that trust is good business. (Vince) 
X3g I want to do my personal best in all areas of my life. (Paul) 
F2a We live in a dog-eat-dog world. (Sara) 
X3c We have a responsibility to society which goes beyond making a profit for our 
owners. (Paul) 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-3 
-3 
Xlb Let’s drop our price to maintain our sales volume; we can’t keep our 10% 
profit margin given this new competition. (Alice) 
Xlb Let’s play this one straight: tell the public the truth. (Vince) 
F3a Paternalism is bad for society: we should not decide what is "best" for the 
public. (John) 
Xlc Market competition makes us do our best, but in this case, someone did 
better. (Alice) 
X3a The aggressive ad campaign involves a moral compromise I’m reluctant to 
make. (Paul) 
excellent) one. "Telling the truth" becomes a competitive advantage rather than a moral 
imperative. Note how these respondents indicate no reluctance to use a cynical ad campaign 
to further their goals (X3a; -3) and find paternalism an acceptable strategy (F3a; -3) 
presumably when they are the guiding patriarchs. 
Beyond the statements listed in TABLE 8, one other statement distinguishes the Factor 3 
group from the others. Flc (-4 / -4 / +1 / -4) states: "After all, as long as my boss tells me 
to do it, it’s okay. (Ed)" Unlike the other groups who strongly disagree (-4) with this 
statement. Factor 3 respondents actually rate this idea somewhat favorably (+1). While (+1) 
may not be a significant rating in itself, the contrasting value of this group from the other 
three gives it importance. The other P-sets were very unwilling either to pass on responsibility 
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or to let the boss dictate morality. This Factor 3 P-set seems not to care. Here is another 
piece of evidence supporting the interpretation that this P-set is fundamentally amoral. They 
almost appear to be a stereotype: make money, follow orders, nothing else. 
Factor 3 respondents offer a second view of effectiveness. This group emphasizes winning 
in the agon, as measured by profit, as the measure of success. Unfortunately, they are willing 
to ignore Friedman’s admonition about "the rules of the game." Honesty and fairness are not 
critical. This factor best exemplifies MacIntyre’s claim that external measures of success can 
degenerate to winning at any cost. In the name of profit maximization, the ends can justify 
the means. 
X3c (+3) poses a problem within this context. Just what does "responsibility" mean to 
these respondents? X3c may reflect a confounding factor, whether it be an unconscious social 
desirability bias or a conscious attempt at window dressing. Beyond these possible 
suggestions I cannot go. 
The existence of Factor 3 offers strong support for the utility of Q methodology in 
studying ethical priorities. This factor, with its amoral emphasis, would not emerge if social 
desirability and/or gamesmanship were influencing the respondents. Here we have quantitative 
support for the anecdotal data of researchers such as Jackall [1988] and Lewis [1989] as well 
as MacIntyre. 
5.2.4. Factor 4: The Effective/Friedmanesque Manager 
Factor 4 (see TABLE 9) offers a Friedmanesque twist. Here the respondents are willing to 
maximize profit, but within the rules of the game (the reader may recall confounding issue #2 
in Section 3.4 which anticipated such a possibility). The agree/disagree items offer an 
interesting polarization. These respondents agree with statements about the desirability ol 
maximizing profit (F2e; +3) and letting the market determine morality (F3d, +4; Fla, +3). 
75 
TABLE 9 
Factor 4: The "Effective/Friedmanesque" Manager 
Wghtd Stmt 
Ave Code 
+4 F 3d 
+4 X2g 
+3 Fla 
+3 F2e 
+3 X3i 
-4 F\c 
-4 F2h 
-4 F3\ 
-4 X2c 
-3 Fie 
-3 X3a 
Statement 
We are "moral" when we compete as hard as we can and let the market take 
care of the rest. (John) 
Working to be an "excellent" company may mean short-term losses, but we’ll 
be better off overall. (Vince) 
We’re a business not a social service agency. (Ed) 
A good manager maximizes profit (Sara) 
Doing the right thing sometimes requires courage. (Paul) 
After all, as long as my boss tells me to do it it’s okay. (Ed) 
People will believe our ads. They buy, they’re happy with what they get no 
one is hurt. (Sara) 
Ethics is fine in books, but in the real world you do what you have to 
do. (John) 
If we misrepresent these products, we manipulate the public which depends 
upon us for much of its information. (Vince) 
We should use our marketing skills to put XYZ in a bad light, even if they 
really have a better product. (Ed) 
The aggressive ad campaign involves a moral compromise I’m reluctant to 
make. (Paul) 
On the disagree side, they reveal their unwillingness to manipulate that market (Flc, -4; 
F2h, -4; X3a, -3). 
Here effectiveness has a distinct moral dimension which differs from MacIntyre’s concept 
of internal excellence or the simplistic view of effectiveness suggested in Factors 2 - 3. This 
morality depends upon a faith in the market to "do the right thing," but with an understanding 
that manipulating the market can destroy the market’s validity as a moral referee. 
Factor 4 has the most mixed rankings of all the P-sets in terms of the Excellence/ 
Effectiveness (X/F) categories (see TABLE 5). Thus Factor 4 appears to be another example 
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of effectiveness, but with a morality more congruent with conventional Enlightenment 
philosophy of utilitarianism. 
One item poses a problem in interpretation: X2c (-4). If this P-set does take a 
Friedmanesque perspective, then they should see manipulation of information as violating the 
basic rules of the market. This may actually be the case: item X2c is somewhat difficult to 
understand. While the statement in context (see Vince’s full statement in Section 4.2.1) shows 
that this statement is meant as a criticism of such manipulation, the respondents may not have 
gone back to the scenario in this case. In a future use of this scenario, this statement should 
be clarified to avoid the interpretation problem faced here. 
5.2.5. Cross-Factor Items 
TABLE 10 indicates a number of Q items which had similar rankings across the four 
factors (no more than 2 steps between greatest and least values). 
Before considering what these items may have in common, it may be possible that these 
commonalities are not relevant. X3f, in particular, was significant for Factor 1 respondents, 
yet rated "neutrally" for the others. While respondents typically place a great deal of effort in 
stating their strong opinions, often they allocate statements in the middle values (+1 to -1) 
rather quickly. These values may have as much discriminant validity as 3 - 5’s. 
Nevertheless, these items do raise some interesting possibilities. First is their potential 
ambiguity. All of them include very common words such as "excellent," "courage," 
"character," and "ethics." Given the distinctions which emerge among the factors below, one 
might wonder if these items have idiosyncratic meanings which would be mutually incom¬ 
patible should they be spelled out to the different P-sets. If so, this highlights one of the 
problems in considering ethical dialogues. We may agree on statements such as X3f without 
really agreeing on anything substantial. Common words, yes; shared meanings, no. 
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TABLE 10 
Cross-Factor Items 
Stmt Wghtd 
Code Aves Statement 
X3f (+3 / +1 / +1 / +2) If I want to be an excellent manager, then I have to live up to the 
ideals within myself. (Paul) 
X3i (+3 / +2 / +2 / +3) Doing the right thing sometimes requires courage. (Paul) 
F2\ (-3 / -4 / -2 / -2) I’m not worried about character. As a manager, only actions 
count. (Sara) 
F3j (-3 / -4 / -2 / -2) In a competitive market, you can’t let "ethics" hurt you or your 
company. (John) 
One of the reasons for utilizing the scenario (see the Instructions in Appendix A) was to 
provide shared connotations so that respondents could consider Q items in a way that made 
responses meaningful. The items in TABLE 10, which show key items being rated the same 
regardless of respondent preferences elsewhere, suggest that this effort was not totally 
successful. 
Beyond this issue of ambiguous meanings, however, another explanation may be 
presented. Regardless of what one respondent’s "ethic" might be, all of them saw ethics as 
important. Here the values were more towards the tails of the Q sorts: in the +2 - +4 (and 
-2 - -4) ranges. Thus all 25 respondents saw themselves as ethical- or at least saw ethics as 
relevant to managers— even if they did not agree with others on what that managerial ethic 
should be. As shown by the negative items (F2i and F3j) they agreed that their personal 
character was important and ethics did have a place in managerial decision making. The 
reader may recall my interpretation of the amorality of the Factor 3 P-set. Such amorality 
does not contradict the implication of these cross-factor items that all of the respondents saw 
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themselves as moral. Even people who have no morality as judged by conventional ethics 
(whether PBE or VBE) may well perceive themselves as moral. 
It may be said that these common statements reflect a generic approval of ethics. While 
this may be true, particularly in the case of F3f as noted above, the forced choices made in a 
Q sort argue against this dismissal. The -2’s for F2\ and F3j not only reflect discomfort with 
those statements, but more discomfort than with statements rated only in the -1 category. 
Another concern relates to how well these espoused values may be lived out in practice. 
This question of praxis is valid and relates to Argyris’ [1957] concepts of espoused values and 
values-in-action. Exploring that distinction, however, goes beyond the scope of this study. 
5.2.6. Summary of Emergent Factors 
Factors 1-4 support the hypothesis stated in Section 3.5. Managers can be grouped 
according to the expressed priorities of excellence and effectiveness. Cooperators (Factor 1) 
can be distinguished from competitors (Factors 2 - 3). As seen in TABLE 1, the 
characteristics of the excellent manager are evident in Factor 1. Factors 2 - 4, on the other 
hand, demonstrate various characteristics listed for the effective manager. Thus MacIntyre’s 
theory of an excellence/effectiveness dichotomy is supported. 
5.3. Analysis of Supplemental Data 
The supplemental data, including the respondent’s class (Marketing or Organizational 
Behavior) and option chosen (marketing campaign or lower price) were coded (see Appendix 
A.5.) TABLE 11 contains these results. TABLE 12 shows the corresponding correlation 
matrix for these data. 
TABLES 11 and 12 reveal some patterns among the respondents which affect the results 
in the following Sections. Not surprisingly, many of the supplemental data are significantly 
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TABLE 11 
Supplemental Data 
FCTR Class Age Yrs Yrs Mgt Cmp You Co Eth Eth % Chg 
Resp Opt Sex wCo Mgr Lvl Lvl Lyl Lyl Cd Lif Agree Mnd 
1 R03 Mk L 24 F 3 1 1 3 3 3 Y Y 0.50 4 
1 R05 OB L 38 F 8 0.5 1 3 1 1 Y Y 0.50 3 
1 R07 Mk L 24 M 2 2 1 3 3 2 Y Y 0.75 5 
1 R0 9 Mk L 30 M 6 3 2 2 3 3 N N 0.50 3 
1 RIO Mk L 40 F 3 9 2 3 3 2 Y Y 0.75 3 
1 R12 Mk L 29 F 4 5 2 2 2 2 Y N 0.25 3 
1 R14 Mk L 35 M 8.5 3 1 3 2 2 Y Y 0.75 4 
1 R15 Mk L 27 F 4 6 1 2 1 1 Y Y 0.25 4 
1 R16 Mk L 24 F 1.5 0.5 1 3 2 2 Y Y 0.75 4 
1 R17 Mk A 29 M 8 2 1 3 2 1 Y N 0.75 3 
1 R18 OB L 30 F 6 2 1 3 2 2 Y Y 0.50 3 
1 R19 OB L 46 F 3 8 3 2 3 3 Y Y 0.90 5 
1 R20 OB L 51 M 8.5 10 2 1 3 2 N N 0.25 5 
1 R21 OB L 38 M 5 1 1 2 2 1 Y N 0.50 3 
1 R22 OB L 47 F 2 4 1 2 1 1 Y Y 0.75 5 
1 R23 OB L 35 F 9 7 2 1 3 2 Y Y 0.75 4 
1 R2 4 OB L 25 F 1 4 1 2 3 3 Y Y 0.50 4 
1 R25 OB L 36 F 7 10 2 2 3 3 Y Y 0.50 3 
2 R0 4 Mk L 28 M 3.5 6 2 2 1 2 Y Y 0.50 3 
2 Rll Mk L 24 M 2 2 1 2 2 2 Y Y 0.50 4 
2 R13 Mk A 26 M 2 2 1 3 2 2 Y Y 0.75 4 
3 R01 Mk A 24 F 0.17 2.5 1 2 1 2 Y Y 0.50 4 
3 R0 6 Mk A 34 M 6 8 2 3 3 2 Y Y 0.75 3 
4 R02 Mk A 28 F 5 2 1 3 2 2 Y N 0.75 3 
4 R0 8 Mk A 34 M 1.5 1.5 1 3 3 2 Y Y 0.75 2 
KEY: 
Class: Mk = Marketing Class Member 
OB = Organizational Behavior Class Member 
Option: L = Lower Price 
A = Aggressive Ad Campaign 
Sex: M = Male 
F = Female 
correlated. Logical examples include the correlations between age and both years with the 
company (0.41) and years as a manager (0.55). Years as a manager, in turn, shows a 
significant correlation with management level (0.78). A number of other significant 
correlations exist in TABLE 12. Those which relate to the significant x relationships of 
80 
T
A
B
L
E
 
1
2
 
C
o
rr
e
la
ti
o
n
 M
a
tr
ix
 f
o
r 
S
u
p
p
le
m
e
n
ta
l 
D
a
ta
 
O Q 
X 2 
O § 
X 
X 
<*P X 
CO 
X 
>h 
X 
X 
CO 
x 
O 
< 
Eh 
X 
O 
CO 
CO 
< 
hd 
u 
e> 
< 
X 
Cxj X 
Eh 
X hd 
X 
X Q 
Eh O 
Cd O 
hd 
O X 
O hd 
^ hd 
cq >h 
co hd 
O. hd 
2 > 
O hd 
Eh hd 
O > 
2 hd 
CO X 
X O 
>h 2 
O 
u 
3 
o o 
O [" o o 
• • 
rH O 
oocg 
O 00 C\| 
• • • 
rH O O 
rH O O O O O 
•K * -K 
OLDtOlOHO^lO o ^ ^ ro i—i o o 
rHOOOOOOO 
I 
* * 
-K -K 
OOOHinUJ'JlOCM^ 
OM/1(OCM(MOHH 
rHOOOOOOOO 
O CO ID 
O (N (N 
r" c\i r- cn co h oo 
rl H rl 00 00 t-H rH 
rHOOOOOOOOO 
O UO CM VO 
O rH rH O 
CO 00 00 CO O'! H 
O rH H 00 CM O rH 
rHOOOOOOOOOO 
ID 
CM 
I 
* 
■K * 
O CM rH IT) OC 
O O ^ I/O *3* 
uo uo m cm o o 
00 H H OO rH rH CM 
tHOOOOOOOOOOO 
O 00 CO 00 O 00 
O CM CM rH CM CM 
CTi UO UO t~- CM U0 *T 
00 O rH rH rH 00 OO 
rH O O O O O 
I I I I I 
■K -K 
O CM H 00 CM C" H 
O CO 00 00 CM CM 
o o o o o o o 
h o ci oo o ^ 
M" O O O O rH CM 
rHOOOOOOOOOOOOO 
V 
0, 
* 
* 
UO 
o 
c 
QJ 
T3 
C 
a C/3 
a 
-X cj 
QJ 
>o 
JO 
c 
QJ 
> 
CIO 
qj c/3 
G 
& C/3 
£ 
CJ 
•e 
qj 
E 
3 
C 
o 
•s 
c/3 
"a 
E 
,QJ 
tu 
II 
CM 
CJ 
O CM VO CO 13 
O 
• 
UO 
• 
CO 
• 
<H 
s 
t-H o o O II 
r— 
• • 
o co uo U0 00 X 
o CM rH o o 
rH 
• 
o 
• 
o 
• 
o o 
w 
* 
* 
c 
V£3 <Ti r- rH QJ 
VO CM o CM o > 
o CO o CM rH U0 uo u 
o o rH H3« CM 00 c 
rH o o O O o o c 
a, 
go D 
8 H 
on 
jS 
E3 ■a 
g> 
II qj 
■=* CM 
co X 
cx uT a 
E £ & 
’■3 J 
* * 
qj 
T3 
< 
0) ^ 
o j 
•C , 
Q- H 
H O 
o z 
£ S 
o 
Z 
II 
CO 
1,3 
c 
cj 
> 
Z 
o 
P 
cu 
O 
QJ 
E 
'c 
qj 
> 
'5b 
££ 
a 
£ 
c/s 
GO 0S5 
5 >* 
s 
II 
CM 
CQ 
O 
II 
CO 
X 
£ 
QJ 
E 
GO S 
% II 
CM 
« 
> 
•a 
8. 
E 
o 
c ^ 
S3 «j 
> > 
GO „ 
13 & 
>o O 
O ON 
£* s 
qj «n 
C/3 
'c« 
a> 
0* 
. » ^ 
<u 
> 
• *—< 
— 
CJ 
< 
> 
II 
on 
qj 
E o 
> «n 
o 
wo 
wo 
00 CM 
II 
CM 
xf 
CJ 
3 
2 
W 
o 
Z 
ii 
C/3 
• i—i 
C/3 
CJ 
oc 
cj 
> 
W 
w 
fie: 
C5 
C 
J 
JH 
J 
Ol 
U 
o 
Z 
II 
CM 
ex 
ii 
c" 
o 
’w 
<D 
3 
a 
ii 
on 
ts 
a 
ex 
3 
•a 
C/3 
« 00 
^ CJ 
H « 
J2 - .§ 
3 
5 
c 
<u 
c 
D 
^ a 
u S: 
> b 
ii J 
X 
H 
m 
QJ | H 
o 
00 
o 
Z 
li 
o CM 
II 
CM 
xf 
CJ 
3 
S 
O 
Z 
C/3 
flj 
>- 
II 
II 
CM 
tf 
a 
Q. 
3 
00 
<U 
> 
t) 
< 
II 
Cd X X — c 
Hd O X hd hd hd Q X X Q V _cd • • u 
CQ 2 O O > > >H >H O H X 2 C/3 
< co O 3 2 X X X X O hd X 2 0, C/3 > 
H CO M O < & 
X < Eh Cd X CO CO Eh X Co X X < e> II 
r 
f rl 
< X o Cd X X e> 2 DQ O Eh Eh X uu ^ > ■H r \ 
> u O < CO >H >H 2 O CO U u X <#> u * O >- 
• • 
- • • 
• • 
W 
Q 
• • 
X h* M 
> 
M 
- 
> __3 
c 
u 
z 
s 
fiu 
s 
M 
SC 
X 
H 
c 
X 
U u 
wo 
< 
>< 
•5 
c 
a 
o- 
< 
G 
a 
00 
3 
3 
Q 
G 
CJ 
E v 
o. 
D. 
3 
00 
<u 
5 
c 
o 
a 
3 
<5 
a 
| 
00 
C 
O 
•a C/3 
«J 
3 cr 
T3 
s 
C/3 
QJ 
T3 
O 
CJ 
>* 
U 
QJ 
81 
Sections 5.3.1 - 5.3.5 will be discussed in those Sections. Because the dependent variable 
(Factors 1 - 4) is merely a nominal measure. Chi-square tests were used to analyze 
relationships between these factors and the supplemental data. To reduce the number of cells 
to a manageable number, the factors were grouped according to the rationale set forth in 
Section 5.2: i.e., as Factor 1 (MacIntyre’s concept of excellence) versus the other three factors 
(different versions of effectiveness). This meant that one axis of the x2 matrix would have 18 
respondents in the first column and 7 respondents in the second. As noted in the discussion of 
Factor 4, this group of persons responded somewhat more ambiguously on excellence/ 
effectiveness dimensions, x2 tests were run with this pair of respondents eliminated, producing 
a Factor 1 v. Factor 2-3 split with an 18/5 ratio of respondents. This alternative approach 
did not produce any results significantly different from the Factor 1 v. Factor 2-4 split just 
described. As there was no difference in the resulting significant items, and as Factor 4 can be 
considered another version of the ethic of effectiveness, the x2 tests were run combining 
Factors 2 - 4 into one group. 
The rows were determined by the various data available. Dichotomous variables (such as 
the option chosen and sex) naturally produced 2x2 matrices while others (e.g. competitive 
level) produced 2x3 matrices. Other data (e.g. age and years with the company) were split 
into categories to produce 2x2 or 2x3 matrices. 
TABLE 13 provides a summary of these x2 tests and notes the cell categories used. The 
four significant relationships involved class, option, age, and perceived company loyalty. As 
the supplemental data were used to explore the research question, items with a/7 < .10 were 
also included. Only respondent’s sex fell within this range. 
Moving beyond the summary provided by TABLE 13, the following tables show the actual 
X2 results for those relationships which proved statistically significant. Appendix D contains 
all of the remaining tables not included here. 
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TABLE 13 
Summary Chi-Square Analyses of Supplemental Data 
XL Prob. Matrix Cell Categories 
Class 5.07 .05 2x2 OB, Marketing 
Option 11.99 . 01 2x2 Lower Price, Aggressive Ads 
Age 5.47 .05 2x2 20-34, 35+ 
Sex 2.97 .10 2x2 Male, Female 
Yrs w/Co 0.94 n. s . 2x2 0-4, 5+ 
Yrs as Mgr 0.23 n. s. 2x2 0-4, 5+ 
Mgmt Level 0.51 n. s. 2x3 Low, Middle, High 
Competition 
Level 0.95 n. s. 2x3 High, Medium, Low 
Mgr Loyalty 1.01 n. s . 2x3 Not Much, Some, A lot 
Co Loyalty 6.48 .05 2x3 Not Much, Some, A lot 
Ethical Code 0.85 n. s . 2x2 Yes, No 
Ethical Life 0.51 n. s. 2x2 Yes, No 
% Agree 1.36 n. s. 2x2 .10/.25, .75/.90 
Change Mind 2.69 n. s . 2x2 1/2, 4/5 
5.3.1. Respondents’ Classes 
The respondents were practicing managers enrolled in MBA programs at three New 
England schools. To be more specific, 16 of the respondents came from a marketing class, 
while the other 9 came from 3 different OB classes. TABLE 14 shows how these classes were 
associated with the four factors. 
TABLE 14 
X2 Analysis of Respondents’ Classes 
Factor 1 Factors 2-4 
Marketing 9 7 16 
Orgn’l Behavior 9 0 9 
18 7 25 
X2 = 5.47; d.f. = 1; p < .05 
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In Section 3.3,1 noted that this study focuses on the individual manager’s subjective 
priorities. I hypothesized the existence of the ethics of excellence and effectiveness. Selecting 
students from Marketing and OB classes proved serendipitous. This result appears to support 
MacIntyre’s contention that education and/or environment play a role in legitimating ethical 
perspectives. All seven of the respondents who chose a form of effectiveness as their 
managerial ethic came from the Marketing class. To the extent that marketing classes 
emphasize external standards such as the agon and competition, such a con-text may have 
encouraged the respondents to adopt the effective perspectives of Factors 2 - 4. Such a 
possibility is only tentative as this result is based upon one marketing class and portions of 
three organizational behavior classes. 
The data gathering techniques used pose some problems in interpretation, however. The 
most prominent of these relates to selection bias in the OB classes. As noted in Section 4.3, 
the OB students were told by their professors that this was a voluntary project to be done at 
home. It may be that among the 40 students who did not respond, we have a number of 
competitors who saw nothing to gain by completing the study. Indeed, such an interpretation 
would fit with MacIntyre’s framework: if they gain nothing from the effort, then there is no 
reason to make that effort. One obvious step in further research will be to use the in-class 
collection method with OB classes as was done with the Marketing class. 
Respondents’ classes correlated significantly with two other variables considered in the 
following sections: Option Chosen (r = -0.42; p < .05) and Age (r = -0.61; p < .05). As the 
respondents’ class variable is somewhat controversial, this might be the appropriate place to 
consider how class affiliation might affect these other two variables. As the reader can see 
from TABLE 11, the OB class supplied a disproportionate number of older students and all of 
the respondents who selected the "lower price" option. While nothing can be said about the 
OB class members who did not respond to the study, there is no a priori reason to assume 
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confounding. The two older (35+) respondents from the Marketing class grouped on Factor 1 
and chose the lower price option as well. 
As a possible answer to the research question, this variable of respondents’ classes is one 
worthy of future study. In spite of the uncertainty about selection bias, the OB data were 
included for two reasons. In a factor analysis of the data from the 16 Marketing respondents, 
the emergent factors still supported the excellence/effectiveness dichotomy.1 The additional 
data from the OB classes merely served to refine Factor 1. Secondly, although suspect, the 
OB/Marketing split was among the most significant. Such findings warranted inclusion here 
as all of the relationships in Sections 5.3.1 thru 5.3.5 are tentative answers to the research 
question set forth in Section 3.5. Each of these areas will need further study to ascertain 
possible causal relationships. 
532. Business Option Chosen 
The second significant relationship exists between the respondents’ factors and the options 
which the respondents chose, as shown in TABLE 15. This relationship was the strongest of 
TABLE 15 
X2 Analysis of Business Option Chosen 
Factor 1 Factors 2-4 
Lower Price 17 2 19 
Aggressive Ads 1 5 6 
18 7 25 
X2 = 11.99; d.f. = 1; p < .01 
1. A similar analysis of the OB students produced only the excellence factor. 
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all those measured, with a p < .01. As the scenario was structured so that the scenario 
managers espousing "excellent" priorities (Alice, Vince, and Paul) favored lowering the price 
while the "effective" managers (Ed, Sara, John) favored the aggressive ad campaign, this result 
is consistent. Respondents who shared the ethical priorities of the scenario managers tended to 
choose the same strategies. 
5.3.3. Respondents’ Ages 
TABLE 16 highlights a logically defensible relationship between age and ethical 
development. The literature on moral psychology [Kegan, 1982; Kohlberg, 1981, 1984] 
TABLE 16 
X2 Analysis of Respondents’ Ages 
Factor 1 Factors 2-4 
34 or younger 9 7 16 
35 or older 9 0 7 
18 7 25 
X2 = 5.47; d.f. = 1; p < .05 
suggests that the higher stages of moral development include a greater sensitivity to how one’s 
actions affect others. This awareness of our interrelatedness would tend to foster a more 
cooperative perspective (Factor 1). 
While age showed a significant relationship with factor, a number of related variables (Yrs 
w/Co, Yrs as Mgr, Mgmt Level) did not. In each of these cases, the trends paralleled 
theresults seen with age, but with the small number of respondents in the F 2-4 category, even 
one person in the "older" categories was enough to push the results past the p < .10 cutoff. 
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The earlier argument that voluntary completion of the study tends to favor an excellent or 
cooperative orientation fits here as well. The strong correlation between older students and the 
OB respondents need not invalidate this conclusion. Indeed, it provides indirect support for 
this x2 finding that older students tend to have an ethic of excellence.1 
5.3.4. Respondents’ Sex 
Another demographic variable showed a significant relationship with the factors, albeit 
only at the p < .10 level. This was the respondents’ sex. TABLE 17 shows that women were 
less likely to hold the ethic of effectiveness than were men. At first glance, this would seem 
to support Gilligan’s (1982) contention that women use a more caring (or cooperative) 
framework than do men. But the Kohlberg/Gilligan debate itself is an on-going one, and 
MacIntyre’s theoretical framework of virtue ethics does not fit easily into the philosophical 
TABLE 17 
X2 Analysis of Respondents’ Sex 
Factor 1 Factors 2-4 
Male 6 5 11 
Female 12 2 14 
18 7 25 
X2 = 2.97; d.f. = 1; p < .10 
1. An attempt was made to find out how these OB classes were divided according to age to see 
if most of the older members responded to the study while most of the younger students did not. 
Unfortunately, one professor did not record the ages of the students in that class, so this question 
could not be answered. 
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framework of that debate. (The reader may recall MacIntyre’s disenchantment with the 
Enlightenment approach to philosophy; Kohlberg [1981] seems quite comfortable with the 
basic Enlightenment emphasis on individualism.) To consider MacIntyre’s philosophical 
relationship to moral psychology, one would have to start with a reconciliation of these 
underlying assumptions about the nature of morality, community, and individuals. Developing 
these links will be one of the opportunities for future development of VBE, but one which 
certainly goes beyond the scope of this work. 
5.3.5. Company Loyalty 
TABLE 18 presents the relationship between the factors and perceived loyalty of the 
respondents’ companies towards the respondents. This relationship is more ambiguous. 
Although statistically significant, the relationship does not present any prima facie rationale. 
The clustering of Factor 2 managers around the central response does not give much room for 
interpretation, particularly as Factor 1 managers show a symmetrical distribution around that 
central response. 
TABLE 18 
X2 Analysis of Company Loyalty to Respondents 
Factor 1 Factors 2-4 
Not Much 5 0 5 
Some 8 7 15 
Very Loyal 5 0 5 
18 7 25 
X2 = 6.48; d.f. = 2; p < .05 
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One might speculate that cooperators would be more likely to think in terms of loyalty 
than would competitors. In such a case, cooperators might be more likely to chose the 
extreme answers of "Not Much" and "Very Loyal" whereas the competitors brush off the 
issue with the neutral "Some." 
TABLE 12 indicates a significant correlation between Company Loyalty to Respondent 
and Respondent Loyalty to Company (r = 0.66; p < .01). TABLE 11 shows that all of the 
Factor 1 respondents rated themselves as loyal or more loyal to their companies than vice 
versa. (No pattern exists for the Factors 2 - 4 respondents.) 
To facilitate comparison of these two tables, the x2 matrix for "Respondent Loyalty to 
Company" is included here as TABLE 19, even though the results were not statistically 
significant. In TABLE 19, we see that half of the cooperators (Factor 1) rated themselves as 
"Very Loyal" (9/18) while only 29% (2/7) of the competitors did so. Again, this trend offers 
some indirect support for MacIntyre’s assertions concerning the excellence/effectiveness 
dichotomy: loyalty is a communal trait which facilitates cooperation yet fetters competition. 
TABLE 19 
X2 Analysis of Respondents’ Loyalty to Company 
Factor 1 Factors 2-4 
Not Much 3 2 5 
Some 6 3 9 
Very Loyal 9 2 11 
18 7 25 
X2 = 1.01; d.f. = 2; p n.s. 
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5.3.6. Non-significant Variables 
A few of the remaining variables did not show any significant relationship with the 
excellent and effective groups. Those variables which had some logical relationship with these 
groups merit a comment here. The x2 tables for these remaining variables are found in 
Appendix D. 
"Years with company," "years as a manager," and "management level" all showed the 
competitors of Factors 2 - 4 to have proportionally less tenure, less experience, and lower 
positions than their cooperative counterparts. But these trends were not significant. Since 
VBE suggests that community values should influence the individual manager’s ethic, further 
study of organizational values and their impact on the manager’s ethics is merited. 
A stronger theoretical link might be made for the relationship of ethical codes of conduct 
and ethical corporate behavior. Here again there was no clear trend in the x2 tests. Given the 
wide variation of codes and the many ways a respondent could interpret the question about 
corporate life, these data do not provide any meaningful answers to the research question. 
Turning to the attitudinal data, perceptions of competitive environment did not present any 
significant associations. This fails to support the thesis that a competitive environment fosters 
effectiveness over excellence. But it is unclear whether their real-life corporate environments 
were relevant to the respondents as they analyzed that particular environment of the 
Managerial Scenario. To get any real input on competitive environments and ethical 
preferences, a field study is needed. 
The respondents on both sides of the fence seemed to have strong convictions that their 
positions were shared by a majority of other managers and they showed a willingness to resist 
an order to change their opinions. 
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5.3.7. Answering the Research Question 
The research question of Section 3.5 asked what demographic and attitudinal variables 
might be associated with the excellent and effective manager groups. This study found that 
managers who espouse an ethic of excellence (cooperators) tended to come from the OB 
classes, be older, and/or be women. Those managers favoring an ethic of effectiveness 
(competitors) tended to come from the Marketing class, be younger, and/or be men. Of these 
variables, class membership and age were correlated to a significant degree. 
As for the attitudinal data, most cooperators chose to lower price while most competitors 
chose to pursue the aggressive advertising campaign. Perceptions of company loyalty towards 
the respondents also showed a statistically significant result although this was difficult to 
interpret as both cooperators and competitors showed a preference for the neutral answer of 
"Some." Still, the issue of loyalty (cf. "Respondent Loyalty to Company") did suggest that 
cooperators saw themselves as more loyal than did competitors. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION 
In this final chapter I begin with a consideration of the results just presented, both in terms 
of what the study shows and what limitations the study has. From there, I discuss the possible 
role which Virtue-Based Ethics might play in the field of business ethics and the hurdles 
which it must overcome. These theoretical considerations then lead me to some suggestions 
for future research, after which I offer a few concluding remarks. 
6.1. Excellent and Effective Managers 
The study identified two groups of managers based on shared values which were 
interpreted as the ethics of excellence and effectiveness. The framework from TABLE 1 
(variables, ethical foci, referents, and language) provided a meaningful structure for this 
interpretation. Thus the results of this study offer empirical support for MacIntyre’s basic 
dichotomy of excellence and effectiveness. 
VBE appears to be far more prevalent among managers that MacIntyre seemed to predict. 
Nearly three-fourths of the respondents fit into his excellent category. There might be several 
reasons for this finding. In the preceding Chapter we considered the possibilities of 
confounding factors (e.g. gamesmanship) and the rise of "excellence" literature. Also, a 
legitimate concern centers on the difference between espoused values and values-in-action. 
But other possibilities exist. VBE itself emphasizes a number of related contingencies 
such as community, role, and individual virtues. While the scenario used suggested a 
community setting and the managerial role, these elements were not strongly developed. As 
noted in Chapter 3, this preliminary study centers on individual managers ranking statements 
as they themselves perceive their own priorities. How these same managers act within their 
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real organizational communities may significantly alter the proportion of managers whom 
MacIntyre would classify as "excellent." But determining such proportions was not the 
primary goal of this study. 
Another reason for the significant proportion of managers who espouse an ethic of 
excellence may involve an organizational imperative which MacIntyre does not recognize. 
While MacIntyre makes a solid case for environmental forces which encourage an 
effectiveness ethic (e.g. utilitarianism/emotivism, Weberian pragmatism, competition), he may 
have misjudged the forces for excellence. As Barnard [1968] notes, business organizations are 
essentially cooperative ventures. A recurring theme in the study of key business values shows 
a continued importance of honesty and integrity [England, 1967; England, Dhingra, & 
Agarwal, 1974; Posner & Schmidt, 1992]. In particular, VBE itself offers an ethical 
framework which fits particularly well with the fundamental structure of organizations: 
community, roles, virtues. Desjardins [1984] and Solomon [1992, 1993] develop this positive 
connection between VBE and business ethics. 
Thus managers face no monolithic force compelling effectiveness, but rather a multiplicity 
of forces in which they must find an uneasy equilibrium. Also, as MacIntyre points out, the 
excellence/effectiveness "dichotomy" is not a pure one. By striving for excellence, a manager 
can be effective. Indeed, in the long run, a communitarian view predicts greater effectiveness 
for the entire system (even if various individual members may not maximize their personal 
effectiveness in the process). And there may be alternatives off the excellence/effectiveness 
continuum such as Friedman’s ethical defense of capitalism. 
MacIntyre’s basic dichotomy of excellence and effectiveness stems from a strong 
theoretical position. His case for the "inevitable" degeneration of individualistic ethics has 
merit. But in the real world, the "battle” for excellence (or virtue) is far from lost. MacIntyre 
has raised critical concerns and provided a paradigm for viewing ethical issues in a helpful 
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way. The next step is to develop this paradigm as a positive tool for developing a conscious 
ethic of excellence. 
One step in such a development of VBE as a business ethic will be to identify 
characteristics by which excellent managers can be identified. The tentative answers to the 
research question are a step in this direction. 
The relationships between the supplemental data and the factors also fit well with 
MacIntyre’s theory. The strongest of relationships-- class, option, and age-- fit with many of 
the predictions concerning community influences, social awareness, and moral maturity. The 
statistically significant results in each of these three areas went in the directions predicted in 
Chapters 2 and 3. Excellent managers were more likely to be from the OB classes, choose the 
more socially responsible course of action, and be older. While the latter variable does not 
necessarily equate with moral maturity, it demonstrates a result which suggests such a 
relationship. 
Managers who loaded on Factors 2 and 3 fit well within MacIntyre’s schema of winning, 
although from somewhat different perspectives (personal winning v. corporate winning). The 
managers who loaded on Factor 4, however, challenge MacIntyre’s dichotomy. This factor 
suggests a group of managers who espouse a more principled defense of effectiveness as a 
"moral" alternative. The questions raised in considering both the study hypothesis and the 
study research question suggest areas for future research. But before moving on to this topic, 
we consider the limitations of the present study. 
6.2. Limitations of the Present Study 
The preliminary nature of this study should be emphasized. Keriinger [1986: 571] 
notes the "tentative" nature of factors which emerge in "early investigations of a field. The 
number of factors can change in subsequent investigations using the same tests. As a first 
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try, this study has demonstrated the utility of MacIntyre’s framework, but only at the most 
basic level. Replication and expansion of the samples come next. The factors identified in 
this study may shift somewhat in additional studies. But only as a large data base is 
developed can these emergent factorial constructs acquire greater validity and generalizability. 
Perhaps the most significant limitation to the present study concerns the sample. Given 
the exploratory nature of this study and the simplicity of the hypothesis, almost any sample of 
practicing managers would suffice. The 16 respondents of the Marketing Class alone provided 
support for MacIntyre’s excellence/effectiveness dichotomy. The additional nine respondents 
from the OB classes gave added support for the excellence ethic, but their inclusion raised 
some troubling questions. Did the absence of competitors from the OB segment reflect an 
influence of that class or was it merely a self-selection bias due to the voluntary nature of the 
data collection method? Did this self-selected sample of OB respondents bias the 
supplemental data in some significant way? 
I will offer tentative answers to these questions. The arguments for a self-selection bias 
offer a stronger a priori case than does the effect of the different classes themselves, so I favor 
that position. Those espousing an ethic of effectiveness in the OB classes probably saw no 
reason to bother with the study. As for the second question, I see no reason why the 
supplemental data (and resulting answers to the research question) should be distorted by the 
inclusion of the OB respondents. 
Correcting these concerns poses no problem other than a logistical one. Q methodology 
proved amenable to group use, as shown by its administration to the entire Marketing Class. 
In a subsequent running of this study, I will use this "whole class" approach with several 
classes. 
Other avenues exist for future work in this area. Stratified samples or samples taken from 
one particular company will offer stronger bases from which to make claims about variables 
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such as the effect of relevant communities, moral maturity, and the like. Expanded and varied 
sampling should be a natural consequence of the continued development of VBE as a business 
ethic. In addition to refining MacIntyre’s concepts, this development will enhance the 
generalizability of the findings. 
Beyond the sampling problems, two other limitations of this study exist. First, the 
scenario and corresponding Q items contained ethical statements which presented excellence 
and effectiveness in their most basic forms. The Managerial Scenario and corresponding Q 
items have an internal validity as they were developed directly from MacIntyre’s concepts. 
But such a theoretical validity does not ensure external validity. In other words, while we can 
see how the Q-sort fits the theory, we cannot be sure that the respondents read those 
theoretical meanings into the items and sorted them accordingly. The cross-factor items of 
TABLE 10 present evidence of some confusion in this regard. 
Any study of subjective issues like managerial priorities will face such problems. 
There was some evidence supporting the external validity of the study. The emergent factors 
could be interpreted consistently using MacIntyre’s theoretical framework. While this 
reasoning may involve a circularity (building an instrument on a theory and interpreting the 
results with the same theory) the use of factor analysis does provide one check. If the 
emergent factors did not fit into the theoretical framework, then my attempt to "force" them 
into that framework would be apparent to the reader. 
The Managerial Scenario does offer a useful approach. With further use, it can be refined 
as its reliability is tested. One variation of this scenario would involve splitting it into two. In 
one version a majority of the managers would favor excellence while in the other a majority of 
the managers would favor effectiveness. When randomly administered, these scenarios could 
provide an experimental manipulation which would provide some information about the 
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respondents’ susceptibility to organizational influence. Other research approaches to the 
excellence/effectiveness dichotomy will help us triangulate on the concept. 
The final limitation to the study to be considered here involves the use of the supplemental 
data. This exploratory study used only the simplest of variables (age, sex, etc.) and the 
simplest of tests (x2). Both of these issues will be refined as research in the field builds upon 
this attempt. The study should progress from research questions about "associated" variables 
to tests of stronger relationships including independent variables with causal relationships to 
the dependent variables of excellence and effectiveness. This refinement of concepts and 
study designs will parallel the increased sophistication in sampling selection just mentioned. 
6.3. Suggestions for Future Theoretical Development 
Neither MacIntyre’s work nor the field of Virtue-Based Ethics are without their critics. 
Pence [1984] critiques After Virtue, finding it vague on central concepts. Solomon [1992] 
criticizes MacIntyre’s dependence on "narrative history" rather than a reliance solely on the 
concepts of virtue as set forth by Aristotle. Louden [1984] notes the tendency of VBE 
theorists to push character to the extent that the right and wrong associated with specific acts 
is neglected. Louden’s position finds support in Rachels’ [1993] comment that VBE is 
"incomplete." 
These critics share a common theme: VBE needs further development. MacIntyre’s own 
work is foundational. In the building of a house, the ground must be cleared away and a 
foundation laid. Such work precedes the construction of the edifice itself. Pence’s concern 
has been addressed in part by Solomon’s [1993] development of the concept of practice. 
Solomon, in turn, further develops the narrative history by building on MacIntyre even as he 
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criticizes it.1 As for the concern about VBE itself, Louden calls for a need to "coordinate 
irreducible or strong notions of virtue along with irreducible or strong conceptions of the 
various act notions... [1984: 235]" Again, the basic call is for further work in developing VBE 
as a theory. 
There are, however, those who criticize VBE at a more basic level. Modem defenders on 
individual rights [Nozick, 1974; Dworkin, 1978; Tomasi, 1991] share a basic distrust of 
community as a primary source of values or virtues. 
One form of this individualist/communitarian debate stems from Friedman’s work. Some 
of the ideas needing further development include the "messiness" of the real world in which 
the ability to "do good" is severely limited. Maximizing profit may be less a matter of 
winning than a moral imperative given the nature of the capitalist system [Friedman, 1982]. 
Viewed from a traditional ethical perspective, it is a utilitarian view that claims to produce the 
best results. Many, such as Etzioni [1988] and Sen [1987], join MacIntyre in questioning the 
true utility of such a system. MacIntyre’s assertions concerning the "inevitable" decay of 
utilitarianism into emotivism were made in the context of long term social changes. Individual 
managers could hold to such an utilitarian position throughout their lives. When studying the 
individual, another issue may be more relevant: given MacIntyre’s assertion that utilitarianism 
is logically inconsistent, could Factor 4 be a "smokescreen" for a more self-serving position? 
If so, how could research be structured to pursue such a question? 
The centrality of community is one of the foundations for organizational behavior. 
Organizations themselves are communities. And organizational ethics is one area in which 
VBE can be developed and expanded. VBE fits well with the study of individuals within 
1. In particular, Solomon criticizes MacIntyre’s particular choice of a narrative history running 
through Thomas Aquinas. But whenever anyone builds on the "foundation" of another- as 
Solomon does directly with Aristotle and indirectly with MacIntyre— then such building falls 
within MacIntyre’s concept of narrative history. 
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organizational communities as these individuals occupy organizational roles. Virtues are those 
characteristics needed to fill these roles well. Solomon [1992, 1993; see Newton, 1992 for 
support] has already begun building on this theme. Williams [1990] has called for continued 
development in this area. 
... a corporation is also a human community, a group of persons working together 
for some common end. Aristotle observes in the Politics that ’every community is 
established with a view to some good,’ and any organized activity requires that 
there be a set of rules or established expectations to guide each person’s behavior. 
[Boatright, 1988: 307-308] 
Beyond this shared emphasis on community, a number of other inherent relationships exist 
between VBE and OB, needing only clarification and elaboration. Examples include the 
impact of organizations on the character and/or behavior of their members [Fritzsche, 1987; 
Jensen & Wygant 1990; O’Reilly, 1989], the role of virtues as motivators [Alston, 1975; 
White, 1959] and work on role conflicts and value congruence [Ashforth & Mael, 1984; 
Dozier & Miceli, 1985; Kahn, et ah, 1964; Liedtka, 1989]. 
Another area for theoretical development was mentioned in the preceding Chapter. VBE 
has some prima facie links to moral and social cognitive psychology. These fields have 
developed as the study of how people grow into more refined stages of understanding. There 
appears to be a natural connection between such "levels of understanding" and an appreciation 
of one’s roles in the community. Another connection is the parallel between stages of 
development and VBE’s stress on virtues/character. But these connections need to be explored 
and defended. Further, they need to be reconciled with MacIntyre’s critique of the pervasive 
influences of the Enlightenment which he claims distorts much of the modem work in ethics. 
Such theoretical work can parallel research into empirical relationships between moral 
development and ethical preferences based upon MacIntyre’s taxonomy. 
So far, the calls for theory development have centered on VBE as an ethical system in its 
own right. One other area of particular interest to business ethicists is the excellence/ 
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effectiveness dichotomy itself. Although the primary purpose of this present study was to 
discriminate between these two ethics, even here I noted that the concept of a dichotomy is 
simplistic. Rather than the "either/or" set forth by MacIntyre, what possibilities are there for a 
"both/and" relationship between excellence and effectiveness? How "good" can a manager be 
in a world with limits, conflicts, and ambiguities? VBE offers a paradigm which can be 
developed to explore these questions and offer managers answers which might include some 
optimal balance of excellence and effectiveness. 
Overall, VBE offers a theoretical paradigm particularly attuned to the needs of managers. 
Developing this paradigm and showing how it directly addresses those needs will be a project 
for the next decade and beyond. 
6.4. Suggestions for Future Research 
Trevino provides a clear statement of the link between theory development and research: 
A social scientific approach to studying business ethics research means, first, using 
theory to develop models and guide research. Based upon logic and empirical 
data, social science theory proposes a set of relationships among concepts that can 
explain and predict attitudes and behaviors. [1992: 121] 
The empirical study of character-- as opposed to behavior- has posed problems for researchers 
in many areas of organizational studies. Vogel comments: 
Contemporary discussions of business ethics focus less on questions of individual character 
than was true a century ago. Indeed, we appear to have almost completely lost sight of 
the fact that the word ethics is derived from the Greek term ethikos, which means 
"character." [1991: 104] 
Part of that shift in focus away from character may relate to the research tools at our disposal. 
Subjective issues were not amenable to investigation using most empirical research tools. Q 
methodology, however, offers a powerful tool for developing constructs which address such 
subjective issues. In particular, its use in the early stages of a developing paradigm is 
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particularly appropriate. It provides empirical evidence of shared subjectivities which can then 
be analyzed to see just what these common "understandings" are.1 
Moving beyond this particular technique, initial support for VBE leads to a number of 
interesting issues. Kelley & Stahelski [1970] found that competitors (as opposed to 
cooperators) believe that everyone thinks like they do. Their respondents may well fit into the 
effective/excellent categories established here. If so, the issue of how effective and excellent 
managers perceive others offers a fruitful line of research. 
Another area worthy of future research is the possible demographic and psychographic 
patterns which may predict a respondent’s factor loadings. Perhaps training in ethics, religious 
background, type of industry, or other variables will emerge as relevant. Only with additional 
studies in which such variables are included can we begin to find such objective relationships 
among respondents. And beyond mere prediction, research can explore the possibility of 
inculcating virtues. Can VBE be taught? Can organizational socialization processes shape 
virtuous character? 
So far, these suggested avenues of research have centered on the individual. Within 
Organizational Behavior, the area of group processes offers another area for study. In 
particular, the work of Asch [1951] on group pressures to distort judgments raises some 
interesting issues. How willing would managers be to shift from excellence to effectiveness 
(and vice versa) if other members of their groups took the opposite position? Indeed, group 
dynamics fits well within the VBE emphasis on community when one notes that organizations 
have both formal and informal aspects. One might use Asch’s approach by having a manager 
state his/her ethic after a number of other "managers" stated the contrary ethic. 
1. On the technical side, the use of Q sorts with whole classes, as described in Section 4.3, 
expands the utility of this technique by providing a very efficient means to gather data in large 
quantities without demanding correspondingly large amounts of the researcher s time. 
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Turning to community influences, these can be incorporated into future studies. Recalling 
Trevino’s [1992] call for experimentation, the scenario/Q sort design used here could be 
modified to show the effects of class membership. Practicing managers could be used from 
"matched” classes (e.g. OB, Marketing, Economics) to see if significant patterns of responses 
could be linked to the course being taken by the respondent. Another variation would be to 
use managers in various companies which have different ethical climates. A third option 
would involve comparing the ethical positions of superiors vis-a-vis their subordinates. 
One more area of research poses some intriguing possibilities. Total Quality Management 
emphasizes quality both in terms of products and relationships and also stresses company 
values [Deming, 1981; Posner & Schmidt, 1992; Walton, 1986]. These emphases are not 
explicitly moral as Keeley [1983] notes. But these emphases might well be amenable to 
Virtue-Based Ethics. Likewise, the emphasis on managerial excellence and ethics [Blanchard 
& Peale, 1988; Covey, 1992; Peters & Waterman, 1982] also fits well with the theory of VBE. 
Tying VBE into such realms will involve further development of both theory and research. 
6.5. Concluding Comments 
With the exception of academicians such as Solomon and Desjardins, much of the work 
relating ethics to business has been done by practitioners. Academics— particularly those with 
backgrounds in business— have much to offer, both in terms of the development of consistent 
theoretical constructs and testing these concepts with rigorous research. We academics can 
help managers move beyond haphazard understandings and idiosyncratic support for ethics. 
In particular, VBE may become the future of business ethics. For such a future to be 
realized, though, academicians will have to break down some barriers. One such barrier is the 
limitations which traditional academic disciplines such as philosophy and management set 
upon theoreticians. Business ethics itself requires interdisciplinary effort. 
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Secondly, business ethicists will have to shift their focus from "business and society" to 
the realm of organizational ethics. While VBE requires some thought about the organization’s 
role within the larger society, its primary emphasis is on ethical issues within the organization. 
Using textbooks in business ethics as an indicator, such issues have received attention only 
recently [as in Cavanagh, 1990; Ferrell & Fraedrich, 1991; Robin & Reidenbach, 1989]. This 
subset of business ethics needs full status as an academic emphasis. 
I share a final concern with Fleming [1987] and Jennings [1991]. They see academic OB 
becoming irrelevant and losing credibility with practicing managers. A formal recognition of 
the significance of ethics to managers and an integration of ethics education into the larger 
realm of management education can help restore both relevance and credibility to the field of 
organizational studies. VBE, as we have just seen, can be a powerful tool for just such an 
effort. 
VBE offers a strong conceptual tool to address Kahn’s concern about the future of 
business ethics: 
The first step is for business ethics researchers to articulate and pursue research 
questions that aim to create social systems that embody the images underlying 
their work. These questions should have both theoretical and practical 
components. The questions should also explicitly reflect combinations of three 
perspectives on ethical behavior in business: the person’s internal awareness of 
ethical principles (philosophy, theology); the organizational contexts of thought 
and action (management, organizational behavior and development); and the 
realities of combining ideals and work demands (practitioners) [1990: 319] 
Such a holistic approach to business ethics (and organizational behavior) breaks down narrow 
definitions of disciplines and departments. It offers challenges for academics and practicing 
managers alike to make a real difference. 
103 
APPENDIX A 
RESEARCH INSTRUMENT 
A.l. Introduction 
This Appendix contains all of the information presented to each respondent in the 
actual study. The materials include: 
* a cover letter, 
* a set of instructions for completing the research project, 
* the Q sort report form, and 
* a Supplemental Data Sheet. 
READER’S NOTE: the actual scenario can be found in Section 4.2.1. 
A.2. Cover Letter 
Dear manager. 
These materials are a study of managerial priorities. This study involves a number of 
practicing managers who are taking MBA courses at various New England schools. It consists 
of three sections: 
* a managerial scenario, 
* a decision evaluation tool (called a Q sort), and 
* a supplemental data sheet. 
Completing the entire study should take you about 45 minutes (based on pre-testing of these 
materials). You should allow about 50 minutes of undisturbed time to complete the study. 
Once you have completed the study, please use the enclosed envelope to mail it back to Keene 
State College. If you choose not to participate, please return these materials to your professor 
at the next class. In either case, thank you for your time and consideration. 
Please complete this study within the next week. In order to analyze the data and report 
back to your professor, I must work quickly. In this report, you will receive a full explanation 
of what the study found and its implications for practicing managers. 
Again, thank you for your participation. 
Sincerely yours, 
Charles M. Horvath 
Visiting Professor, Keene State College 
enc. 
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A.3. Instruction Sheet 
STEP 1: Managerial Scenario 
Please read the Scenario on pages 3-4 of this Study. It concludes with a question about a 
managerial decision you must make. Please read this scenario now. Once you have 
made your choice, go on to step 2. 
STEP 2: Q sort 
2.a: In the Study packet, you will find a set of 3x5 cards and another set of cards with the 
statements made by your "fellow" managers. 
2.b: Next, take the statement cards. There are 48 of these. Feel free to shuffle them if 
you wish, they are already in random order. Each card has a statement made by one of 
the managers (who is indicated on the card; the number is a random one used in Step 3). 
If you have a question about what a statement means, you can reread that portion of the 
scenario to get a feel for how that manager used the phrase. After reading a statement, 
place it in one of 3 piles: 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
These piles need not be equal... simply make an initial judgment of each statement as it 
was meant by the manager and decide whether or not you agree with that statement 
yourself. 
2.c: Once you have sorted the 48 statements, take the 3x5 cards and lay them out on a 
table as follows: 
Strongly Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
2.d: Now take the "Agree" pile and choose the two statements with which you agree most 
strongly. Place these two statements on the card marked +5. (Notice that 2 is the number 
in parentheses under the +5.) 
2.e: Move over the "Disagree" pile and choose the two statements with which you 
disagree most strongly. Place these two statements on the card marked -5. 
2.f: Return to the "Agree" pile and chose three of the remaining cards with which you 
most strongly agree and put these in the +4 card. Do the same for the Disagree pile 
with the -4 card. Continue this back & forth approach until all of the statements have 
been placed. 
2.g: NOTES: 
* When either the "Agree" or "Disagree" pile runs out, use the middle pile of statements to 
continue the process. 
* If you wish, you can switch cards from one pile to another. The key issue is to have the 
right number of statements in each pile once they are all sorted. 
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* This is an anonymous study. No one but you will know how you sorted these 
statements. Please give your honest input as a manager. If you faced this scenario in 
real life, which statements most accurately reflect your beliefs about being a manager? 
* If you find these instructions confusing, you can call me at (413) 527-4571 evenings. 
STEP 3: Data collection sheet 
3.a: Once you have sorted the statements, please take page 5 of the Study, the "Data 
collection sheet." For the +5 category, mark the numbers on the two statements you put 
on the +5 card. Then put the card and statements in the envelope marked "Completed Q 
sort." 
3.b: Do the same for the +4 set and so on down the line. In this way, if the cards get 
shuffled in the mail, you have included a hard copy of the results of your managerial 
priorities. 
3. c: This "Data collection sheet" also has a spot for your original decision. Please mark 
the appropriate space. 
STEP 4: Supplemental data sheet 
4. a: The final sheet in this Study (pages 6-7) lists some supplemental data about yourself. 
Please complete the front page of this sheet. 
4. b: On the back of this sheet is a space for optional comments. You may write down any 
personal questions or reactions if you wish, or ignore this side. 
STEP 5: Mailing 
5. a: Place the following items in the enclosed envelope: 
* Q sort envelope with 3x5 cards and statements 
* Data collection sheet 
* Supplemental data sheet 
Seal and mail at your convenience. 
5.b: You may keep the Managerial Scenario if you wish. Note the "Respondent Code" 
marked on the scenario. The final report sent back to your professor will include the 
results of each respondent. You can use this code to see how your responses compared 
with those of your peers. 
Thank you for your time and cooperation. 
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A.4. Data Collection Sheet 
Respondent Code 
Manager’s Decision: (1) m 
Lower Conduct 
Price Ad Campaign 
+5: 
+4: 
+3: 
+2: 
+1: 
0: 
-1: 
-2: 
-3: 
-4: 
-5: 
READER’S NOTE: Each Q item appeared on a separate card with a random number (see 
Appendix B). These cards were themselves randomized before being given to respondents. 
Once the respondents completed their Q sorts, they recorded the random numbers on this 
sheet These numbers, in turn, were entered into a spreadsheet program and cross-referenced 
to the statement codes. 
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A.5. Supplemental Data Sheet 
Respondent Code 
READER’S NOTE: Numbers in parentheses give coding scheme reported in TABLE 11. 
This is the final step of the study. Please complete these questions 
about yourself and the actual company for which you presently work. 
Thank you. 
Your age: _ Your sex: M F 
(1) (2) 
Years with your present company: _ 
Years of managerial experience: 
Are you a: Lower level manager (1) 
Middle level manager (2) 
Upper level manager (3) 
How competitive is your company's business environment? 
_ Very competitive (1) 
_ Somewhat competitive (2) 
_ Not very competitive (3) 
How loyal are you to your firm? Not much Some Very loyal 
(1) (2) (3) 
How loyal is your firm to you? Not much Some Very loyal 
(1) (2) (3) 
Does your company have a < code of ethics? Yes No 
(1) (2) 
If yes, does your company appear to make these ethics an important part 
of its daily • life? Yes No 
(1) (2) 
In your opinion, what percentage of managers would choose the same 
option as you did? (for the ad campaign or lower price)? 
Circle your answer: 
10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
Recalling the scenario, if your VP came to you afterwards and told you 
to reverse your decision, how would you react? 
Actively Unenthusiastically 
Support New Support New 
Decision Decision 
(1) (2) 
Question 
the VP, 
Support New 
Decision 
(3) 
Passively 
Resist the 
New Decision 
(4) 
Strongly 
Object, 
Actively 
Resist New 
Decision 
(5) 
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OPTIONAL: You may add any comments you wish concerning this study. (E.g. how did the 
scenario help you understand the statements? Did the ideas of the other managers in the 
scenario alter your responses in any way?) 
NOTE: Very few written comments were included here. Most of those which were included 
stated that the respondents found the scenario helpful when determining the intent of a 
particular statement on a Q item. 
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APPENDIX B 
LISTING OF Q ITEMS 
This Appendix contains the Q items derived from the Managerial Scenario, 
sorted according to the a priori categories explained in Chapter 4. The Item Code uses "X" for 
excellence and "F" for Effectiveness; the 1-3 refers to the level of intensity; the small letter to 
the particular statement within that set. The Random Number (Rndm #) refers to the sorting 
number which appeared on each card so that the respondents could complete the Data 
Collection Sheet Finally comes the Q item itself. 
Item Rndm 
Code # Q Item 
Alice (Excellence, Level 1; XI) 
Xla 
Xlb 
Xlc 
Xld 
Xle 
45 If XYZ offers a better product at our price, logic says we’re going to lose 
something. (Alice) 
21 Let’s drop our price to maintain our sales volume; we can’t keep our 10% profit 
margin given this new competition. (Alice) 
08 Market competition makes us do our best, but in this case, someone did 
better. (Alice) 
11 We should take the loss for now and get R&D to come up with a product which 
matches or beats XYZ’s: then we’ll earn our way to the top. (Alice) 
31 The VP may not like our recommendation, but he’ll want the truth from 
us. (Alice) 
Ed (Effectiveness, Level 1; FI) 
Fla 30 
Fib 22 
Flc 29 
Fid 23 
Fie 40 
We’re a business not a social service agency. (Ed) 
It’s our job to give the boss what he wants. (Ed) 
After all, as long as my boss tells me to do it, it’s okay. (Ed) 
We must do whatever we can to maintain our profit margin. (Ed) 
We should use our marketing skills to put XYZ in a bad light, even if they really 
have a better product. (Ed) 
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Item Rndm 
Code # Q Item 
Vince (Excellence, Level 2; XI) 
X2a 19 
X2b 41 
X2c 07 
X2d 32 
X2e 27 
X2f 02 
X2g 24 
X2h 43 
X2i 10 
Using our marketing power is one thing, but using it to lie is another. (Vince) 
Let’s play this one straight: tell the public the truth. (Vince) 
If we misrepresent these products, we manipulate the public which depends upon 
us for much of its information. (Vince) 
Our customers trust us: and keeping that trust is good business. (Vince) 
We can’t let a short-term "fix" blind us to the long-term risks. (Vince) 
Even if we lose profits on this product, honesty benefits our company in the long 
run. (Vince) 
Working to be an "excellent" company may mean short-term losses, but we’ll be 
better off overall. (Vince) 
For me, it’s a question of professional integrity: I want to be a good manager in 
a good company. (Vince) 
Being a good manager involves doing what’s right for my company and my 
society. (Vince) 
Sara (Effectiveness, Level 2; FT) 
F2a 31 
Fib 33 
F2c 04 
Fid 47 
Fit 15 
F2f 36 
Fig 05 
Fib 28 
Fix 17 
We live in a dog-eat-dog world. (Sara) 
Trust the market: if people buy our product, we win. If not, XYZ wins. (Sara) 
Excellence is not "inside" us: excellence is winning in the market. (Sara) 
A good company beats the competition. (Sara) 
A good manager maximizes profit. (Sara) 
A good manager gives the boss what he wants— and our boss wants that 10% 
return. (Sara) 
This isn’t about customers, it’s about out-running the XYZ Corp. (Sara) 
People will believe our ads. They buy, they’re happy with what they get, no one 
is hurt. (Sara) 
I’m not worried about character. As a manager, only actions count (Sara) 
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Item Rndm 
Code # 
Paul (Exc< 
X3a 20 
X3b 16 
X3c 46 
X3d 14 
X3e 13 
X3f 18 
*3g 35 
X3h 44 
X3i 38 
X3j 42 
John (Effc 
F3a 26 
F3b 34 
F3c 06 
F3d 39 
F3e 09 
F3f 03 
F3g 48 
F3h 01 
F3i 25 
F3j 12 
The aggressive ad campaign involves a moral compromise I’m reluctant to 
make. (Paul) 
I like working here because I make a good product, benefit society, and feel 
good about myself as a person. (Paul) 
We have a responsibility to society which goes beyond making a profit for our 
owners. (Paul) 
The ’trust’ issue is not just a matter of good business, it’s a matter of good 
ethics. (Paul) 
As managers, it our personal responsibility to do the right thing even if it costs 
us some money in the short run. (Paul) 
If I want to be an excellent manager, then I have to live up to the ideals within 
myself. (Paul) 
I want to do my personal best in all areas of my life. (Paul) 
I learned that ’honesty is the best policy’ when I was just a child, and that still 
holds for me as a manager. (Paul) 
Doing the right thing sometimes requires courage. (Paul) 
Managers are moral agents who have to use their judgment to balance the needs 
of society and the company. (Paul) 
Paternalism is bad for society: we should not decide what is "best" for the public. 
(John) 
We benefit society by making as much profit as we can: nothing more. (John) 
In America, the market decides what is "moral", not managers like us. (John) 
We are "moral" when we compete as hard as we can and let the market take care 
of the rest. (John) 
Managers shouldn’t use terms like "good & bad." We need terms like "strong & 
weak," "winners & losers." (John) 
Our duty is to our boss and to ourselves. (John) 
We need to worry about our own careers as much as the company or 
society. (John) 
I’m not risking my job for some abstract moral principle. (John) 
Ethics is fine in books, but in the real world you do what you have to do. (John) 
In a competitive market, you can’t let "ethics" hurt you or your company. (John) 
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APPENDIX C 
SUPPLEMENTAL SPSS/PC+ OUTPUT 
C.l. Principal-Components Analysis 
Extraction 1 for Analysis 1, Principal-Components Analysis (PC) 
Initial Statistics: 
Variable Communality ★ 
★ 
Factor Eigenvalue Pet of Var Cum Pet 
R1 1.00000 ★ 1 12.15677 48.6 48.6 
R2 1.00000 ★ 2 2.26936 9.1 57.7 
R3 1.00000 ★ 3 1.43061 5.7 63.4 
R4 1.00000 ★ 4 1.21610 4.9 68.3 
R5 1.00000 ★ 5 .91688 3.7 72.0 
R6 1.00000 ★ 6 .85852 3.4 75.4 
R7 1.00000 ★ 7 .72531 2.9 78.3 
R8 1.00000 ★ 8 .63992 2.6 80.9 
R9 1.00000 ★ 9 .59943 2.4 83.3 
RIO 1.00000 ★ 10 .51147 2.0 85.3 
Rll 1.00000 ★ 11 .50260 2.0 87.3 
R12 1.00000 ★ 12 .45829 1.8 89.1 
R13 1.00000 ★ 13 .42559 1.7 90.8 
R14 1.00000 ★ 14 .36876 1.5 92.3 
R15 1.00000 ★ 15 .32980 1.3 93.6 
R16 1.00000 ★ 16 .29273 1.2 94.8 
R17 1.00000 ★ 17 .26796 1.1 95.9 
R18 1.00000 ★ 18 .23683 .9 96.8 
R19 1.00000 ★ 19 .19123 .8 97.6 
R20 1.00000 ★ 20 .18745 .7 98.3 
R21 1.00000 ★ 21 . 14269 .6 98.9 
R22 1.00000 ★ 22 .10855 .4 99.3 
R23 1.00000 ★ 23 .08616 .3 99.7 
R24 1.00000 ★ 24 .05316 .2 99.9 
R25 1.00000 ★ 25 .02385 .1 100.0 
PC Extracted 4 factors. 
READER'S NOTE: Part of this Appendix appears in TABLE 4. 
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C.2. Varimax Rotation Grouping Respondents by Factor 
Varimax Rotation 2, Extraction 1, Analysis 1 - Kaiser Normalization. 
Varimax converged in 8 iterations. 
Rotated Factor Matrix: 
FACTOR 1 
R20 .88594 
R7 .85510 
R25 .83371 
R12 .83238 
R22 .82835 
R5 .82253 
R24 .82215 
R18 .81757 
R23 .78700 
R10 .76651 
R9 .76034 
R19 .75051 
R21 .73316 
R14 .71686 
R16 .71649 
R3 .65929 
R15 .62804 
R17 .60772 
R13 -.01259 
Rll .28503 
R4 .51535 
R6 -.15962 
R1 .11675 
R2 -.03573 
R8 . 40211 
FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3 
-.10574 -.05519 
.16947 -.09654 
.21019 .10608 
-.12442 -.11058 
.13842 -.01439 
-.02208 .04023 
.19482 .07370 
.17227 .18720 
.18189 .07526 
.25029 -.09276 
.12739 .15965 
.12662 .09633 
.01338 .19235 
.37592 -.00929 
.17047 -.01346 
.33991 .08067 
.36159 .35915 
.07720 .47203 
.82115 .15088 
.69592 -.07803 
.54655 .11434 
-.16763 .78180 
.32672 .73697 
.28782 . 11424 
-.06915 . 13771 
FACTOR 4 
-.09377 
.11327 
.23457 
-.18295 
.20507 
.06522 
.01102 
.10541 
.21702 
.08551 
.24541 
-.02345 
.06931 
.06165 
.10325 
.08620 
-.18358 
-.12297 
.10241 
.40200 
-.17680 
.36478 
.03536 
.72609 
.63995 
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C.3. Factor Score Coefficient Matrix 
Factor Score Coefficient Matrix: 
FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3 FACTOR 
R1 . 02305 .25378 .20993 -.33335 
R2 .01090 .27245 -.00325 .38963 
R3 .06037 .04768 -.07756 -.03223 
R4 .05126 .07042 -.20024 -.27614 
R5 .06509 -.08504 .08590 .05424 
R6 -.00549 .23901 .49358 -.02012 
R7 .07082 -.05831 -.06620 .09847 
R8 .03728 .10692 .19741 .41195 
R9 .06607 .03165 .08826 .09664 
RIO .06533 -.03066 -.11201 .05762 
Rll .03983 .22509 -.31336 .15797 
R12 .06008 -.20502 .03454 -.03453 
R13 . 01841 .28235 -.31486 -.17274 
R14 .06459 .02371 -.13819 -.02071 
R15 .05844 .06175 .01435 -.33202 
R16 .06063 -.02354 -.03561 .05558 
R17 .05253 . 02719 .21316 -.27107 
R18 .07046 .01157 .06712 -.01909 
R19 .06223 -.04258 .02648 -.06373 
R20 .06600 -.17369 .06571 .00235 
R21 .06025 -.02783 .13776 -.01238 
R22 .06967 -.02356 -.00226 .13591 
R23 .06826 .01701 .01910 .09843 
R24 .06938 -.03060 -.00951 -.04473 
R25 .07296 .02996 .02505 .09329 
NOTE: The factor score coefficient matrix provides weighted scores for the respondent 
loadings for each of the four factors. Unfortunately, SPSS/PC+ does not standardize these 
fractions to sum to 1. I corrected this omission via a Lotus spreadsheet in which I took the 
values for each factor and recomputed them to get a proportional value. Using Factor 4 as an 
example: 
Raw Weighted Fib Raw Fib Weighted 
Rspndnt: Coefficient: Coefficient: Scores: Scores: 
(Raw/Sum) (Weight x Fib Raw) 
R2 .38963 .48608 +2 0.97 
R8 .41195 .51392 -1 -0.51 
Sum: .80158 0 (rounded) 
This value of 0 can be found for Factor 4, Item Fib, in TABLE 5. 
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APPENDIX D 
CHI-SQUARE ANALYSES OF SUPPLEMENTAL DATA 
As explained in Chapter 5, respondents loading on Factor 1 emphasize managerial 
excellence, while respondents loading on Factors 2-4 emphasize various forms managerial 
effectiveness. The search common factors use the Chi-square test as these factors are non- 
parametric. To make the number of cells manageable, certain groups were combined. Factor 
1 (with 18 respondents) stays the same while Factors 2 - 4 are combined. As for the 
supplemental data, these were grouped to form 2 x 2 or 2 x 3 matrices. Groupings are 
explained below as appropriate. 
Respondent Class has been included here for illustrative purposes. Otherwise, only x2 
tables which were not included in Chapter 5 are shown here. 
Respondent Gass 
Factor 1 Factors 2-4 
Marketing 9 7 16 
Orgn’l Behavior 9 0 9 
18 7 25 
x2 = 5.47; d.f. = 1; p < .05 
Here is a sample x2 calculation for Respondent Class. All others were performed in the same 
manner. 
9 (16 * 18 / 25) 7 (16 * 7 / 25) (Numbers in parentheses 
9 ( 9 * 18 / 25) 0 (9*7/ 25) are the expected values) 
(9 - 11.52)2 + (7 - 4.48)2 + (9 - 6.4 8)2 + (0 - 2.52)2 
X2 =     
11.52 4.48 6.48 2.52 
= 0.55 + 1.42 + 0.98 + 2.52 
= 5.47 
degrees of freedom = (r - 1) (c - 1) = (2 - 1) (2 - 1) = 1 
116 
Years with Company 
Factor 1 Factors 2-4 
0-4 9 5 14 
5 + 9 2 11 
18 7 25 
X2 = 0.94; d.f. = 1; p ILS. 
Years as a Manager 
Factor 1 Factors 2-4 
0-4 11 5 16 D 
5 + 7 2 9 U 
18 7 25 | 
X2 = 0.23; d.f. = 1; p n.s. 
Management Level 
Factor 1 Factors 2-4 
Lower 11 5 16 
Middle 6 2 8 
Upper 1 0 1 
18 7 25 
X2 = 0.51; d.f. = 2; p n.s. | 
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Competitive Business Environment 
Factor 1 Factors 2-4 
Very Competitive 2 0 2 
Some 8 3 11 
Not Very Competitive 8 4 12 
18 7 25 
X2 = 0.95; d.f. = 2; p n.s. 
Company Ethical Code 
Factor 1 Factors 2-4 
Yes 16 7 23 
No 2 0 2 
18 7 25 
X2 = 0.85; d.f. = 1; p n.s. 
Company Lives Ethical Code 
Factor 1 Factors 2-4 
Yes 13 6 19 
No 5 1 6 
18 7 25 
X2 = 0.51; d.f. = 1; p n.s. 
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Percent of Fellow Managers Who Agree With Choice 
Factor 1 Factors 2-4 
10% - 25% 3 0 3 
75% - 90% 8 4 12 
11 4 15 
X2 = 1.36; d.f. = 1; p n.s. 
Support for Reversed Decision 
Factor 1 Factors 2-4 
Support 0 1 1 
Resist 10 3 13 
10 4 14 
X2 = 2.69; d.f. = 1; p n.s. 
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